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ABSTRACT 
 
THE LAUNCHING OF THE TURKISH THESIS OF HISTORY: 
A CLOSE TEXTUAL ANALYSIS 
 
CEREN ARKMAN 
M.A. in History  
February 2006 
Thesis Supervisor: Prof Halil Berktay 
 
Keywords: nationalism, history, Turkey 
 
The following is a dissertation on the Turkish Thesis of History, focusing 
specifically on a certain instant in its development, namely the First Turkish History 
Congress in which the Thesis was fully formulated.  
Taking its lead from the ideas of Benedict Anderson, the dissertation is based on 
the assumption that the nations are imagined cultural constructs; and that it is primarily 
the style in which it is imagined that gives a nation its distinctive character. Developing 
these ideas, the work turns its attention to the methods of such imagination and 
incorporating the ideas of Anthony D. Smith on national myths, devises a conceptual 
framework for making sense of the interrelations among the formation of nations, the 
writing of national histories and the creation of national myths. 
In light of this theoretical framework, the papers of the Congress are analyzed in 
detail in order to trace clues of the distinctive characteristics of Turkish nationalism –its 
peculiarities which were to a large extent dictated by the limits (real or imagined) in 
reaction to which Turkish nationalism developed.       
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ÖZET 
 
TÜRK TARİH TEZİNİN ORTAYA ÇIKISI: 
BİR METİN İNCELEMESİ 
 
CEREN ARKMAN 
Yüksek Lisans, Tarih 
Şubat 2006 
Tez Danışmanı: Prof Dr. Halil Berktay 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: milliyetçilik, tarih, Türkiye 
 
Ekteki tezin konusunu genel anlamda Türk Tarih Tezi oluşturmaktaysa da, asıl 
odaklanılan bu Tezin gelişiminde belirli bir andır: Tezin tam anlamıyla ortaya atıldığı 
Birinci Türk Tarih Kongresi. 
Benedict Anderson’ın teorilerini temel alan tez, milletlerin hayali cemaatler 
olduklarını ve milletlere ayırdedici özelliklerini kazandıranın bu tahayyülün farklı 
tarzları olduğunu varsayar. Bu fikirlerden hareketle, dikkatini bu tahayyül tekniklerine 
çevirir ve Anthony D. Smith’in milli efsaneler hakkındaki düşüncelerinden de 
faydalanarak milletlerin oluşumu, milli tarih yazımı ve milli efsanelerin yaratımı 
arasındaki ilişkileri anlamlandırmayı mümkün kılacak bir kavramsal çerçeve 
oluşturmaya çalışır. 
Bu teorik çerçeve ışığında, Türk milliyetçiliğinin ayırdedici yönlerini ortaya 
çıkarmak amacıyla, Kongre’de sunulan tebliğler detaylı bir incelemeye tabi tutulur. Bu 
incelemede karşılaşılan özellikler genelde Türk milliyetçiliğinin muhalif olarak geliştiği 
gerçek ya da hayali bir takım kısıtlara denk gelmektedir. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
There is an ever-growing literature on the emergence, development and nature of 
nationalism(s). Given its political power and the normative standing it has acquired over 
the last century, this is only natural. Yet, the quantity of the theories devoted to this 
issue does not necessarily translate into qualitative differences. All the allegedly fervent 
conflicts of opinion usually turn out to be nothing more than claims to an established 
academic career/territory on the behalf of the individual theorists. 
There seems to be no argument among the academic circles that nationalism –at 
least, in the form we know it today- is a modern phenomenon. There is also no denying 
its close ties with the state –though there may be disagreements about which one 
preceded the other. Yet for our current intents and purposes, what matters most is its 
constructed nature.  
Nationalism, as well as nationality, are not essentials but rather constructed 
categories. There are those who believe them to be socially-constructed; those who 
believe them to be politically-constructed; and those who deem them discursive 
constructs.1 Whichever theory one may choose to adopt, two things seem to be clear: 
that they are historically-constructed and that they require a good deal of imagination. 
The first proposition seems self-evident –nationalism is an historical movement. It is the 
product of a specific historical period; and has developed under certain historical 
                                                 
1
 As an example of a state-centered approach, see John Breuilly, Nationalism and the 
State, Manchester University Press, 1995; as examples of an approach based on socio-
economic transformations, see Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.), The 
Invention of Tradition, Cambridge University Press, 1997, and Gellner, Nations and 
Nationalism, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983; for an example of an approach that regards 
nationalism as a narrative, see Bhabha (ed.), Nation and Narration, Routledge, 1990; 
and The Location of Culture, Routledge, 2004. 
  
 
2 
conditions ever since its first appearance. If we listen to Smith, it is also “profoundly 
‘historicist’ in character”2 –not only historians abound among its creators and critics 
alike, but also there is no denying the historicist world-view it imposes on its followers 
–that is a world-view based on the existence of distinct nations with distinct characters, 
all marching down their own path of development. Moreover, it is evident that various 
socio-economic and political developments, which might be singled out as the carriers 
of the germ of nationalism are all specific to a certain historical period, i.e. the 
(European) modernity. So are different narrative strategies that we associate with 
nationalism. It is now to the second proposition that we turn our attention.       
 
 
1. Imagining the Nation 
 
 
 If nation, nationality and nationalism are not natural, essential and unchanging, 
forcing themselves on people, who do nothing but passively submit to them; 
‘imagining’ –better than any other verb- captures the soul of the activity involved in 
their construction. This term has been coined in 1983, by Benedict Anderson in his 
brilliant work, Imagined Communities3 and has been quite popular ever since. Of 
course, there have also been fierce opponents of the idea –among the nationalists 
themselves to say the least. Opposition has also been voiced in academic circles. Yet 
behind all the sound and the fury, when dust settles down, there seems to be no 
disagreement on the idea that nations should be imagined.  
 The most refined criticism to Anderson’s thesis comes from Anthony D. Smith, 
who has –quite unfairly- been called a primordialist by many and whose ideas about 
nations and nationalism, along with those of Anderson’s, will provide the main structure 
of this work. Thus, before going any further, it seems appropriate to reconcile the ideas 
of these two theorists who have been relentlessly working to differentiate their 
positions.  
                                                 
2
 Smith, “Nationalism and the Historians”, in Gopal Balakrishnan (ed), Mapping the 
Nation, London: Verso, 1996, p. 175. 
3
 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism, London: Verso, 1990. 
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 Basically, Smith claims that the nations are build on pre-existing ethnies (ethnic 
categories) and thus one cannot hope to understand nations and nationalism without first 
coming to terms with this fact. Not withstanding his insistence on the ethnic origins of 
nations, in some places, he comes close to admitting that the nations are to a large 
extent imagined. While claiming that “nations always require ethnic elements”, he 
grants that they may “be reworked; they often are”4. Yet it is not clear how that 
reworking is any different than imagining. As a matter of fact, among the modernists –
and later on, the post-modernists- (including Anderson himself), there is no one who 
would claim that nationalism does not require any prior cultural material to work on, or 
that it can simply will nations into existence without any reference whatsoever to 
material reality. For instance, Gellner claims that “nationalism is not the awakening of 
nations to self-consciousness; it invents nations where they do not exist –but it does 
need some pre-existing differentiating marks to work on, even if… these are purely 
negative”.5 Smith argues that his insistence on the presence of “ethnic elements” is 
enough to prove that the nation has something real about it –as opposed to the fictive 
nature that the modernists ascribe to it. Yet, when he goes down one level and examines 
what he calls the “ethnic elements”, he is forced to admitting that ethnicity can itself be 
“‘constructed’, ‘reconstructed’ and sometimes plainly ‘invented’”.6 Thus he ends up 
telling us the same old story in a different level. Finally, he finds a way out: while 
admitting that “many nationalisms seek to create nations where none existed” –referring 
to Gellner’s original formulation-, he nonetheless argues that the nations that are most 
stable and enduring are those that are based on prior existence of strong “ethnic 
elements”.7 Keeping in mind that elsewhere, he had commented on the unplanned 
nature of the Western European nationalisms and on how all other nationalisms were 
“created by design”8; it is as if he is considering non-Western nationalisms as 
exceptions to the rule/norm –which will prove important in examining the Turkish case.  
 Actually, there is no need to hunt for clues in order to arrive at the conclusion 
that Smith’s position on the emergence and the development of nations and 
nationalism(s) does not conflict with Anderson’s “imagined communities”. To see how, 
                                                 
4
 Anthony D. Smith, National Identity, Penguin Books, 1991, p. 40. 
5
 Quoted by Smith, ibid., p. 71. 
6
 Smith, “Nationalism and the Historians”, p. 193. 
7
 Anthony D. Smith, “Ethnic Nationalism and the Plight of the Minorities”, in Smith 
Myths and Memories of the Nation, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 190. 
8
 Smith, National Identity, p. 100.  
  
 
4 
it is enough to go over, in brief, over the main propositions of his theory. Smith defines 
the nation as “a named community of history and culture, possessing a unified territory, 
economy, mass education system and common laws”9. Evidently, what differentiates a 
nation from an ethnic community is its political organization; an ethnic community with 
a congruent state organization will be a nation. Yet, one should not assume that the 
qualities that go into the making of the ethnic community and the characteristics that 
come with a modern state organization simply add up to produce the nation. The nation 
does not place itself easily on the ethnic community which meanwhile retains its 
previous character; the state rather transforms the ethnic community and turns it into a 
nation. As Weber claimed, it is “political action, more than anything” which can 
“transform ethnic communities into nations”.10 So, what we should really concern 
ourselves with are the ethnic communities –as there can be no argument against the 
amount of construction and imagination that is necessarily involved in politics. Smith 
provides six elements that go into the making of an ethnic community (ethnie): a 
collective name; at least one differentiating element of common culture; a myth of 
common ancestry; shared historical memories; an association with a specific 
‘homeland’; a sense of solidarity –at least for a significant portion of the population.11 
Except for the second one, all the other elements are subjective ones. Moreover, all are, 
in some way, related to myths. A name is always imagined/invented/constructed –all 
those things which Smith claims the nation not to be; there can be no argument on that. 
By saying that its name is one of the elements that make a group of people an ethnie, he 
hints at some form of imaginary activity taking place. As Hans Blumenberg posits, “all 
confidence in the world begins with names about which a story can be told”.12 Thus a 
name is the starting point for a myth-making process. All the other elements are directly 
linked with such a process; for nations preserve/reconstruct their memories primarily 
through myths and national solidarity is to a large extent the result of myths of ethnic 
descent. Moreover, the way to establishing a ‘homeland’ also goes through myth-
                                                 
9
 Anthony D. Smith, “The Origins of Nations”, in Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny 
(eds.), Becoming National: A Reader, Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 107.  
10
 Smith, “Nationalism and the Historians”, p. 180. 
11
 Smith, National Identity, p. 21.  
12Quoted in Riekmann, “The Myth of European Unity”, in Geoffrey Hosking and 
George Schöpflin (eds.), Myths and Nationhood, London: C. Hurst & Co., 1997, p. 63.  
  
 
5 
making.13 The only “objective” element we are left with is a differentiating element of 
culture; yet Smith himself argues that “it is only when such markers are endowed with 
diacritical significance that these cultural attributes come to be seen as objective, at least 
as far as ethnic boundaries are concerned”.14 This final criterion has an objective reality, 
yet it is the subjective understanding of -and the experience people associate with- this 
objective reality that goes into the making of the nation. Thus, it can also be regarded as 
a somewhat subjective element. 
Hence, an amount of imaginary activity is a must for the development of a 
nation. Yet, as Smith asserts, there are limits to such an activity. Then again, 
imagination is never boundless. There are also limits to what one can imagine. 
Imagination does not entail creating things out of the blue and without limits; rather it 
signifies a creative endeavor. Moreover, it does not necessarily require intention –
though it may. Thus, all myths need to be imagined but there is no guaranteed outcome; 
one can try to tailor a myth but there is no guessing the final form it will take. So is the 
case with the nations, which all require myths. Social engineering and conscious efforts 
on the behalf of the rulers to produce a nation are not meaningless; though there is no 
guarantee that they will attain the intended results. That is probably the reason why the 
name of Anderson’s book is Imagined Communities, rather than say, Imagining 
Communities. There sure is an imaginary activity going on but it is not necessarily 
conscious or purposive; and there is no telling who the subjects and the objects of this 
verb are. Each and every one of us imagines himself as part of a certain nation and in 
doing so make and remake that nation. Yet, this is something that we are made to do –as 
a conclusion of the social and political context within which we are situated-, as much 
as something we do ourselves.  
We will assume that nations are imagined communities –yet no less real for that; 
and that myths are crucial in the construction of nations. We will examine the First 
Turkish History Congress as an attempt at construction –or at least, guiding people in 
                                                 
13
 For lengthy analyses of these different kinds of myths, see Anthony D. Smith, 
“National Identity and Myths of Ethnic Descent”, in John Hutchinson and Smith (eds.), 
Nationalism: Critical Concepts in Political Science, Vol. 4, Routledge, 2000; “The 
‘Golden Age’ and National Renewal”, in Geoffrey Hosking and George Schöpflin 
(eds.), Myths and Nationhood; and “Nation and Ethnoscape”, in Smith, Myths and 
Memories of the Nation.  
14
 Smith, National Identity, p. 23.  
  
 
6 
the construction- of certain myths, which will eventually go into the construction of the 
Turkish nation and its identity. 
Before moving on to the analyses of the papers presented and the discussions 
that took place in the congress, we will go over the details of the works of Benedict 
Anderson and Anthony D. Smith –with occasional reference to other theorists of the 
field- and try to highlight the ways in which they apply to our case. 
 
 
2. Imagined Communities 
 
 
 Anderson claims that nations should be evaluated not on the basis of their 
genuineness or artificiality but rather with reference to “the style in which they are 
imagined”.15 After all, if we believe –with Anderson- that nationalism and nationality 
are merely “cultural artifacts of a peculiar kind”16, there is no such thing as an authentic 
nation but only a variety of nations imagined in different –and not so different?- styles. 
We can say that all societies that depend on the functioning of institutions are 
imaginary; that is, they are “based on the projection of individual existence into the weft 
of a collective narrative, on the recognition of a common name and on traditions lived 
as the traces of an immemorial past”.17 In this context, the genuineness-artificiality 
dichotomy breaks down for only the imaginary communities can be real or vice versa. 
According to Anderson, the nation is “an imagined political community –and 
imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign”.18 It is imagined because the 
members of a nation will only get to know a very little portion of the people that make 
up that community; thus they should constantly imagine and assume each other’s 
existence in order for a bond to develop among them. It is a community –rather than a 
society- because it is experienced by its members as “a deep, horizontal comradeship” 
based on the ideal of fraternity.19 In a similar vein, Gellner descries nationalism as “a 
phenomenon of Gesellschaft using the idiom of Gemeinschaft: a mobile anonymous 
                                                 
15
 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 15. 
16
 Ibid., p. 13. 
17
 Etienne Balibar, “The Nation Form: History and Ideology”, in Geoff Eley and Ronald 
Grigor Suny (eds.), Becoming National: A Reader, p. 138. 
18
 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 15. 
19
 Ibid., p.16. 
  
 
7 
society simulating a closed cozy community”.20 It is limited because the very existence 
of an “inside” presupposes and necessitates the existence of an “outside”. A nation can 
best be described through those “others” who do not belong with that community. It is 
sovereign, because it has emerged in an historical period, in which the older sources of 
legitimacy and sovereignty –the church and the dynasties- were losing ground and there 
had developed a crisis of legitimacy which had to be overcome in order to make it 
possible for any form of sovereignty to be exercised.  
If we turn our attention to Turkish nationalism, we can see almost a perfect 
match with this definition. The early Republican period in Turkey witnessed the 
construction of the Turkish nation and the national solidarities in various ways. Aside 
from constant references to the sanctity of the Misak-ı Milli (National Oath) frontiers 
and emphasis on Atatürk’s adage “peace at home, peace abroad”, the boundaries that 
separated the inside from the outside and Turk from its various others were becoming 
more defined and rigid as a consequence of certain physical policies such as the 
exchange of populations between Turkey and Greece. By then “popular sovereignty” 
had already become a catchword. In Republican propaganda, popular sovereignty had 
taken the place of the sovereignty of the Sultan/Caliph, who had supposedly betrayed 
and abandoned the nation. Former loci of power and legitimacy –be they real or 
symbolic- (such as the Sultanate, the Caliphate, the dervish lodges) and their various 
instruments and/or symbolic remnants (such as the Arabic script, the lunar calendar, the 
old system of measurement and laws) were done away with in the first decade of the 
Republic. 
According to Anderson, the preconditions for the emergence of a community, 
which will define itself as a nation, are the loss of faith in prior loyalties and forms of 
identification –that is, a situation in which men can no longer make sense of their 
existence within a system based either on religion or on dynasties (or both)-; and the 
transition from a religious/mythical time to a calendar time.21 Identification with a 
nation provides a framework within which men might find meaning in the fatality and 
contingency of everyday life and the transitory nature of all physical things. It supplies 
people with a feeling of continuity and a purpose in life in a world in which loyalty to 
the Church or to the King can no longer help people situate themselves; a world 
definitively disenchanted by the impact of the Enlightenment and the Revolution. The 
                                                 
20
 Ernest Gellner, Nationalism, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1997, p.74. 
21
 Anderson, Imagined Communities, pp. 20-37. 
  
 
8 
nation seems –to the nationalist- as if it has been there from time immemorial and as if 
it will remain intact forever. This myth of the nation-as-out-of-time provides the people 
the security they seek in a hectic world. Accordingly, Anderson argues, the nation 
should be understood not strictly as a consciously-held political ideal, but rather as 
analogous to religious imaginings.22 This experience of nationhood, constructed 
primarily through the consumption of the same or -at least- similar printed materials 
with the people with whom one shares a “homogeneous empty time”, is a modern mode 
of human existence –though the nationalists claim it to be anything but modern. 
Historically, it is linked with the demise of religious beliefs (which in a way includes 
the decline of the power of the dynasts, for their sovereignty was to a large extent based 
on a form of religious legitimation), that is, with the 18th century European history. 
Anderson uses the notion “homogenous empty time” in the way that Benjamin does –to 
refer to a time marked by temporal coincidence and measurable with calendar and 
clock. The transformation of the perception of time in this direction is what was 
mentioned before as the abandonment of religious and mythic time. This is what makes 
it possible for people to imagine themselves as part of a nation while reading their 
morning newspapers –with the knowledge/belief that other members of their 
community are reading the same news at the same time.23 
While explaining the historical causes and the development of the notion of 
“nation” and of nationalism in length, Anderson emphasizes the emergence of print-as-
commodity and standardized print languages.24 It is basically through these two that the 
nation is imagined. On strikingly similar lines with Anderson, Yusuf Hikmet Bey makes 
the following comments about the role of printing in the development of nationalist 
sentiments: 
   Milliyet hissi…evela aynı lisanı konuşan ve aynı kitapları ve gazeteleri 
okumakta aynı zevkleri duyan, aynı tarzda düşünmeye alışan, aynı 
hadiselerle müteessir olan, aynı mazi ile iftihar eden, istikbal için aynı 
ümitleri besleyen insanları birbirine bağlayan hislerdir. Bundan maada, 
menfaat ve ihtiyaçlarını basılmış kitap ve gazeteler sayesinde daha çabuk 
ve anlayışlı bir surette takdir eden insanların birbirine karşı duyduğu 
tesanüttür.25 
                                                 
22
 Ibid., pp. 18-9. 
23
 Ibid., p. 30. 
24
 Ibid., pp. 41-9. 
25
 “The sense of nationality…is first and foremost about the sentiments that bind 
together people who speak the same language and who get similar pleasure, get used to 
thinking in the same way, feel grief at the same events, take pride in the same past, have 
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Moreover, the bureaucratic middle classes, who were indispensable for the 
nation-states that had been established as a norm in the international arena by the end of 
the Great War, had been consolidated through the use of print languages. As opposed to 
all the prior ruling classes –which depended on personal loyalties and kinship ties for 
their reproduction-, the bureaucratic middle classes imagined themselves through the 
use of common print languages; they were the first classes to achieve solidarities on a 
predominantly imaginary basis.26 The Turkish bureaucracy was no exception to that 
rule; the Turkish bureaucrats were all educated in the new western style institutions of 
education –which began to supply the personnel of the government starting from the 
mid 19th century- and they all studied the same -or similar- textbooks. 
Anderson also provides a historical typology of nationalisms. The original 
models were those of America and France and they were based on national languages. 
What really concerns us here is the idea that no process of nation-building/formation 
could have been spontaneous once the initial moment of inception had passed. The 
moment that the idea of nation became a concept, it had also become a model for all the 
others to copy.27 In this regard, Turkish nationalism cannot be thought as independent 
from all the other nationalist movements that preceded it. The standard of becoming a 
nation has become a commodity in its own right through the publications on the French 
Revolution and has gone into circulation throughout the globe. Yet, since that model 
was so well defined and established, it imposed standards on the new states, “standards 
from which too-marked deviations were impermissible”.28 There is no denying the 
direct and not-so-direct influences of the French Revolution on Turkish nationalism. 
Yet, it would be misleading to claim that Turkish nationalism modeled the French 
experience in every detail. There was another model which proved at least as important 
as the French one; it was “official nationalism”.     
 Anderson borrows this term from Seton-Watson and describes it as a 
conservative movement which developed in reaction to the popular nationalist 
                                                                                                                                               
the same hopes for the future, all from reading the same books and newspapers. As a 
result, it is the solidarity felt among people who appreciate each others interests and 
needs in a quicker and more perceptive manner thanks to printed books and 
newspapers.” Birinci Türk Tarih Kongresi: Konferanslar-Müzakere Zabıtları (from now 
on referred to as BTTK), Maarif Vekaleti, 1932, p. 511. 
26
 Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 74. 
27
 Ibid., pp. 66-77. 
28
 Ibid., p. 78. 
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movements based on national languages. This can in a way be summarized as an 
attempt to reconcile and reconnect the people with the dynast.29 The primary policy 
instruments utilized by official nationalism are state-controlled compulsory primary 
education, propaganda, militarism, the rewriting of (national) history by state initiative, 
the constant affirmation of the identity of the people and the person of the dynast.30 
 Developing the idea that both these types of nationalism can be copied and 
modularly reconstructed, Anderson draws our attention to the fact that the nation-
formation/building policies of most of the newly-founded nation-states combines 
elements from both the popular and the official variants of nationalism. Moreover, 
official nationalism proves most effective during the formative stages of these newly-
founded nation-states. As soon as the state builders overtake the power from the old 
regime –that is, the first time they find themselves in a position in which they can 
implement the state apparatus to broaden and augment their own policies and projects-, 
they shift considerably away from popular -and towards official- nationalism.31 Then all 
the above mentioned instruments can be put to use to reconcile the nation not with the 
dynast, but rather with the state.  
The formative years of the Turkish Republic provides a good example of these 
arguments. According to François Georgeon, Turkish nationalism combined two 
distinct forms of nationalism. One was developed mainly among the military and civil 
bureaucracy and was based on a territorial and political patriotism –what we might 
affiliate with the official nationalism. The other was developed by the intelligentsia and 
the incipient national bourgeoisie and was based on a notion of ethnic and cultural 
national identity; what we might affiliate with the popular nationalist movements based 
on vernacular mobilization.32 Beginning at the turn of the century and gaining pace after 
1908 and once again after the founding of the new regime, these two variants of 
nationalism merged. What united the two and formed probably the most basic 
characteristic of Turkish nationalism, was the priority of the state. In Turkish 
nationalism, the political and strategic interests of the “state” –whether it was Ottoman 
or Republican- always took priority over all other criteria. In this context, one might 
argue that the merger between the lines of national thought was not egalitarian in 
                                                 
29
 Ibid., p. 83. 
30
 Ibid., p. 95. 
31
 Ibid., p. 145. 
32
 François Goergeon, “Bir Kimlik Arayışı: Türk Milliyetçiliği” in Georgeon, Osmanlı-
Türk Modernleşmesi (1900-1930), İstanbul: YKY, 2006, p. 17.  
  
 
11 
character, but rather consisted in the taking over of the arguments and strategies of 
popular nationalism by its official counterpart, leading to an official nationalism which 
nonetheless retained some of its popular overtones.  
Moreover, it is possible to see the counter-parts of all the instruments mentioned 
by Anderson in the early Republican Turkey. Those that are of greater importance for 
our present purposes are compulsory primary education, official rewriting of national 
history and affirmation of the identities of the leader and the people. Aside from 
assuring that everyone acquires the ability to read and write, which is the prime 
instrument in making it possible for the nation to be imagined-, compulsory primary 
education guarantees the diffusion of the image of the imagined nation imposed by the 
state on the people in the hope of turning them into a homogenous community. The 
poems, marches, catch-all slogan definitions pertaining to the Turkish history and the 
Turkish Republic that we learn (and can never forget) are all instruments of this state 
nationalism.  
Gellner tells this story in somewhat different words. His argument is as follows: 
In advanced industrial societies, which depend on sustained growth and constant 
innovation for their survival, a man is usable only if he is educated. Since this kind of 
society necessitates people who can deliver and decipher messages instantaneously, 
sustained schooling and semantic discipline on the behalf of the people become musts. 
Hence, for the first time in human history, “a high culture becomes the pervasive, 
operational culture of en entire society”.33 It is through the inculcation of this High 
Culture that schools help construct the nation. Elsewhere, Gellner argues that the 
attainment of High Culture is not sufficient by itself for being integrated into such a 
society. Aside from the mastery of the required skills, one needs to possess “personal 
attributes compatible with the self-image of the culture in question”.34 He emphasizes 
the fact that High Culture is never universal but rather always articulated in a particular 
language and contains particular rules for comportment in life; “modern industrial high 
culture has an ‘ethnic’ coloring, which is of its essence”.35 Likewise, Hobsbawm 
underlines the importance of primary education in the invention of traditions for the 
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nation and describes it as the “secular equivalent of the church”.36 Smith, commenting 
on Eugene Weber’s Peasants into Frenchmen, emphasizes the central role of history 
teaching in nation-formation, reminding us that the period under consideration was the 
time when a standard history text book went into circulation throughout France –
including the colonies. It had various editions for successive age groups and all French 
students studied that textbook.37 From this perspective, if we remember that the First 
Turkish History Congress was convened with the explicit purpose of revising the 
history textbooks devised for high-school students and instructing the high school 
teachers in this new territory of standardized national history education, its importance 
becomes more lucid.    
The initial cadres of the Republic were filled with people who had been educated 
in the Western-style schools of the late Ottoman period and who had received in those 
institutions a European –and especially French- style history education. Complaints 
about this issue were voiced repeatedly in the First Turkish History Congress. The 
discussants fervently argued that the textbooks translated from European languages did 
not serve the national interests, the knowledge they had of the Turks were deeply flawed 
and prejudiced and hence it was a grave necessity for the Turks to write their own 
history. To give but one example of the criticism directed against translated history 
books in the Congress, we can look at the comments of Yusuf Akçura on the issue: 
“Türk mekteplerinde düne kadar, dikkatsizlik eseri olarak, Avrupanını ve bilhassa 
Fransanın dünyaya nazarı tedris ve telkin olunmuştur.”38   
Yet, occasionally they referred to certain benefits of such foreign sources. For 
instance, it was through these books that the generations supplying the new Republic 
with its initial cadres, came to admire the French Revolution. Such criticisms were 
under way since the 1908 revolution, which reinstated the study of general history of 
civilizations in schools; this decision led to a need to translate in haste textbooks from 
European languages –especially French-, which was followed by a wave of criticism, 
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the main point of which was that these textbooks were not written from a nationalist 
perspective and hence harmful to national interests.39 
During 1930s, the official re-writing of Turkish history has been systematically 
conducted through the efforts of Türk Tarih Kurumu – Turkish History Association 
(formerly Türk Tarihi Tetkik Cemiyeti – The Society for the Investigation of Turkish 
History) and that official history has been popularized through primary and secondary 
education. Most important and maybe the most distinctive point in this regard is that the 
project was far more ambitious than simply re-writing the national history; it aimed at a 
re-writing of world history based on the Turkish nation –what might be called a 
Turcocentric history. 
Finally, the qualities of the people –more importantly the leader- were constantly 
emphasized and idealized in every possible way; and the unity and solidarity of the 
nation was symbolically constructed around the person of Atatürk, in whose character 
the qualities of the nation acquired their ultimate perfection. 
Anderson also discusses in detail the post-colonial nation states, which make up 
a considerable portion of the nationalist movements of the 20th century. What is 
important for our discussion is that Turkish nationalism has great affinities with this 
kind of nationalism especially with regards to the techniques that they all utilize in 
nation-formation/building –though Turkey has never been a colony per se. This might 
be a result of the Westernization attempts of the late Ottoman period; or a consequence 
of Turkey’s semi-peripheral position in the world-system. Breuilly claims that though 
Turkey has never been a colony literally, it was nonetheless quite like one in terms of 
economy and culture. He argues that Turkish nationalism was an example of reform 
nationalism and that reform nationalisms outside Europe shared many characteristics 
with anti-colonial nationalisms, such as “the desire to reform indigenous society along 
modern lines; to reject various economic controls and western pretensions to cultural 
superiority; and to link both a reformed and independent state and society to a sense of 
national identity”.40 The only difference between these two kinds of nationalism was 
one of scale: reform nationalism outside Europe had to transform the state apparatus –in 
addition to the cultural identity- in order to be effective, and thus the reforms 
undertaken had to be more thoroughgoing and practical than those of anti-colonial 
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movements. Breuilly’s ideas somewhat clarify the affinity between Turkish nationalism 
–as a form of anti-imperial movement, as a reaction against the domination of the 
world-system by the imperial powers to the disadvantage of peripheral and semi-
peripheral nations- and the anti-colonial nationalisms.  
If we turn to Anderson, he underlines the importance of the young generations, 
who knew foreign languages and who have been educated in the West.41 They related to 
the European history and thought by way of the education they had received, while 
forming feelings of solidarity among themselves. They were the ones that formed the 
core of the nationalist movements and, later on, the basis of the ruling cadres of the new 
regime; and they constantly underlined their youth in order to distance themselves from 
the ancien régime and the values it upheld. Their youth stood in stark contrast to the 
oldness of the regimes they have replaced. The Young Ottomans and the Young Turks 
movements of the late Ottoman period, as well as the emphasis on youth in Republican 
Turkey are good examples of this issue.  
    If the “nation” is a cultural artifact –which can, and should constantly, be re-
constructed-, then it makes sense to try to understand nations and nationalism through 
the examination of cultural texts and cultural policies, such as the papers presented and 
the discussions undertaken in the First Turkish History Congress. Yet, all the above 
examples, do not take us much further than the general theoretical outline of Anderson’s 
work. If all nations are imagined and constructed, these do not provide distinctive 
markers for the nation under examination. To return to the point where we started, it is 
not its imagined nature but the style in which it is imagined that differentiates a nation 
from all the others.  
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2 
 
MYTHIC IMAGINATION OF NATIONALISM: 
MYTH-MAKING AND OFFICIAL HISTORY 
 
 
 
Nations and nationality are imagined; and not once and for all, they have to be 
constantly imagined. To be able to gain insight into a particular nationalism, one should 
try to trace the ways in which this imagination becomes operative. There are several 
ways in which one can approach such a task. One of them is to assume a strong link 
between the nation and the nation-state and try to tackle how the state produces and 
reproduces the nation and the national identity. There are two primary reasons why we 
should be concerned with nations and nationalism –and they are interrelated: nationality 
forms the primary source of identification in the modern world; while the nation forms 
the primary source of legitimation for the states. If nationalist sentiments and ideas were 
not connected to real political struggles, no one would really care about them42; it is 
their actual or potential relation to a state that makes them interesting subjects of study. 
Moreover, personal attachment to a nation is more or less the modern day religion, 
providing each and everyone with an identity. If the modern state needs to control the 
people, it does it less by coercion and more by what Foucault calls pastoral government 
–the reference being to a religious form of governing, to no surprise. Thus, the state is 
pretty much involved with the identities of its citizens and put a lot of work into 
creating a suitable collective identity for the nation it both controls and represents.    
Hobsbawm claims that “the ‘nation’ with its associated phenomena…rest(s) on 
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exercises in social engineering which are often deliberate and always innovative”.43 
Developing on that idea, we will try to look at a specific instance of attempted social 
engineering and use it as a test case for the nationalism theory in general. 
We will mainly follow the blueprint provided by Smith –with occasional 
reference to other theorists-, since we share his concern with myths. Myth-making 
figures prominently in the imagination of the nations. Myths are crucial for producing 
and reproducing –and when need be, transforming- them. National history is another 
crucial element in the formation and preservation of nations and national identities. 
These two are intimately linked: they feed into each other, borrow techniques and 
discourses from each other, etc. Moreover, both can be fabricated and manipulated by 
the state –though the success of such an attempt is quite fleeting at times. Naturally, the 
newly formed nations are more eager to involve themselves in such projects of social 
engineering. Hobsbawm comments on the problematic relationship between the state 
and history in the following way: “the element of invention is particularly clear here, 
since the history which became part of the fund of knowledge or the ideology of the 
nation, state or movement is not what has actually been preserved in popular memory, 
but what has been selected, written, pictured, popularized and institutionalized by those 
whose function it is to do so”.44  
Assuming this proposition to be valid, we will try to see how the Turkish 
Republic tried to manipulate history writing in an attempt to create a nation in its 
formative years. We will focus on a specific instance of this project of forming a 
national identity through the use of national history, the First Turkish History Congress 
of 1932, where the official Turkish history thesis fully asserted itself.  
First we will take a look at the formation of nations and try to locate the Turkish 
case in a theoretical typology of nationalism and nation formation. Then we will try to 
see the relationship between myth-making and the formation of national identity. After 
examining the functions of myths and their relation to history –and other associated 
human sciences-, we will go on to study in detail types of national myths. All this 
theoretical information will constantly be referred to –and checked by way of reference 
to- the Turkish case. Yet, before all else, a brief overview of Turkish historiography –
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with an emphasis on the specific instances of the official history thesis and the First 
Turkish History Congress with which we are concerned here- is due.       
  
 
1. Official History and the First Turkish History Congress 
 
 
During 1920s and 30s, the formative years of the new Republic in Turkey, one 
can hardly speak of an ideologically and culturally monolithic society. Being but a new 
state and lacking in refined technologies of government, the Republic could hardly 
produce a totalitarian state effect approaching in its impact that of its contemporaries, 
Germany, Russia or even Italy. The Kemalist cadres lacked a compact ideology and a 
solid theory of knowledge; they were on the whole pragmatists. Yet that did not mean 
that there were not certain theories that they preferred and tried to incorporate into their 
national educational program; or that they did not chose between various theories of 
history; or that certain approaches to history were not better suited to the ideological 
needs of the new state.45   
The Turkish historiography was –and to a large extent, still is- national and 
nationalistic. It was a national history in that it was dominated by a meta-narrative of 
“Turkish History”.46 General history figured only in reference and as appended to this 
meta-narrative. Moreover, Turkish History was believed to be unique and thus immune 
to all comparative historical approaches.47 It was nationalistic to the extent that the 
whole history writing was shaped and marked by an extensive use of “we” and “our”. 
This historiography was also defensive, for during its formative years, roughly 
from the turn of the century to about 1935, it developed in a certain historical context, 
which it tried to master and give meaning and which in turn dictated its nature and its 
limits. This historical context was mainly shaped by the European imperialism –and its 
cultural counterpart, Orientalism- which it had to fight against; by the Ottoman ancien 
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regime which it first had to distance itself from and then to destroy; by rival 
nationalisms with which it had to compete for the title to Anatolia.48 The limits of 
Turkish national history and of Turkish national identity -and how those limits 
translated into unique configurations in both- will be examined in more detail in a later 
section of this work. 
There were two other characteristics of the official Turkish historiography. The 
first one was its monumental quality, in Nietzsche’s terms: it was the history of 
greatness -of great deeds and men. This kind of history writing resembled myths; and 
was devised with the explicit intention of providing the people –especially the youth- 
with heroic examples, stimulating them for similar heroic acts. In order to produce such 
ideals of greatness for emulation, the monumental history should necessarily be 
intentionally incomplete.49 Not only does it avoid recounting the failures of the 
nationalist past to a large extent –or at least, makes up excuses for the existence of such 
failures-, but also does not concern itself with the causes of historical developments. 
Since history does not repeat itself and every historical event is bound to and 
determined by its context, every historical occurrence should be unique. In turning the 
historical events of past epochs into examples for copying –or in order to be able to do 
so-, monumental history severs the event from its specific context –makes it in a way 
ahistorical. The heroic national past is transformed into a heroic national quality which 
is basically out of history/time.  
Second, the official history was geographical. It was strictly attached to the idea 
of the homeland; Turkish history comprised the Central Asian origins and the history of 
Anatolia. Its categories were based on geography at the expense of relevant historical 
criteria –including historical periodization: for instance, the history of all the different 
cultures of Anatolia were combined under the heading of Anatolian history; or cultures 
which occupied larger territories were divided into two parts and their presence in 
Anatolia was studied under the heading of Anatolian Civilization with total disregard of 
the unity and integrity of such historical entities.50 Moreover, the official history thesis 
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made extensive use of geography, utilizing its more scientific and solid credentials as a 
science, in order to legitimate itself. Keeping in mind that the Central Asian component 
of this history thesis was almost totally lacking in documents, there was a tendency to 
assimilate evidence from other disciplines and one of the tactics used was to resort to a 
form of geographical determinism to back the claims of the official history thesis –
especially when it came to the issue of migrations from Central Asia. 
The project of the official history thesis began in 1928 and took its final form in 
the First Turkish History Congress of 1932. Naturally, it did not develop out of the blue. 
On the one hand, it was a result of and a reaction to the above mentioned historical 
context and was shaped to a large extent by the limitations brought about by this 
context. On the other hand, it was the culmination of an intellectual heritage; it had its 
predecessors.  
A Turkish nationalism and national history -on similar lines with its later official 
version- was developing by the turn of the century, especially through articles published 
in the popular press. For example, starting from 1896 the İkdam began to publish 
articles on Peking Turks, Kirghizs, Kipchaks, etc. which reflected a national/ethnic 
consciousness and an interest in Turkish language. These efforts can be regarded as a 
form of vernacular mobilization. Moreover, in the articles of the period, there were 
already references to the natural qualities of the Turkish people and the impact of Turks 
in the unfolding of world history.51 All these were, to a large extent, triggered by the 
developments in Turcology that took place throughout the 19th century and that gained 
speed after the deciphering of the Orhun inscriptions –dating from the 8th century- in 
1892. These developments not only suggested the antiquity of the Turkish nation but 
also indicated a cultural unity among the Turkish speaking peoples.52 After the 1908 
Revolution, with the immigration of numerous Russian Turks to the Ottoman Empire, 
the pan-Turkic ideals developed in reaction to the pan-Slavic policies of the Russian 
empire were imported to the Empire and these gave new impetus to the development of 
the Turkish nationalism, supplying it with a romantic aura.           
Within this nationalist movement, there were certain people that stood out; 
Etienne Copeaux emphasizes three of them in particular in respect to their influence on 
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the development of the Turkish history thesis. The first one was Yusuf Akçura, who 
was a founding member and the first president of the Türk Tarihi Tetkik Cemiyeti, 
which was founded in 1931 and which undertook the project of the development of new 
history textbooks and the convention of the First Turkish History Congress, together 
culminating in and representing the full maturation of the official history thesis. During 
the first decade of the century, young Akçura was already formulating the basic tenets 
of a Turkish nationalism. He argued that the Turks had retained a considerable amount 
of their former culture and some of their former laws after they converted to Islam. 
According to him, throughout their long history, Turks had shown little attachment to 
territory and religion, but great commitment to their language and national customs and 
characteristics. Among those traditional characteristics of the Turks were: patriarchy; 
communal ownership of the land; the concentration in the person of the leader a great 
amount of power which was nonetheless circumscribed by some form of law; the 
presence of an aristocracy; a tendency for state-building; and religious toleration.53 
These ideas were important in that they spoke of a Turkish identity separate from the 
Islamic identity –thus, a Turkish history separate from the Islamic history. In 1908, 
while most people were discussing the affinities between the constitutional regime and 
the Islamic idea of şûrâ in order to legitimate the new regime, Akçura was referring to 
precedents from the Turkic past. This was a bold move which in effect placed the 
Turkish national tradition on the same level with the Islamic law; hence, Islam became 
only one of the traditions that have affected the Turkish nation.54 
The second important ideological forefather of the official Turkish History thesis 
was Ziya Gökalp, who has sketched the basic tenets of this theory in 1923 in his book, 
Türkçülüğün Esasları. In this work, Gökalp defines all former political communities of 
Turks as autonomous, unified and institutional states. He claims that the basic common 
motivation of all these states was their commitment to bringing peace to the world; and 
that these communities were organized around principles of equality and even 
feminism.55 
The third character of great influence on the official history thesis was Zeki 
Velidi Togan, whose book entitled Umumi Türk Tarihine Giriş (1928) probably formed 
the germ of this thesis. In this book, he argued the brachycephalous quality of the 
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Turkic race and recounted the prehistorical migrations which this race to Italy, 
Mesopotamia, India, Egypt, etc. uncivilized inhabitants of which were civilized by the 
arrival of the Turks.56 This strategy of equating the Turkish nation with the Turkish 
race; and then claiming that the diffusion of human civilization throughout the world 
took place with the spread of the Turkish people over the globe and their encounters 
with more backward races is exactly replicated in the Turkish history thesis. The 
following comments on the pattern of diffusion of civilization by Reşit Galip make the 
connection more lucid: 
   Diğer tiplerin kendi kendilerine dünyanın herhangi yerinde müstakil, 
aslî medeniyetler kurabilmiş olduklarına dair arkeolojik ve antropolojik 
pek müşkülatla vesika verilebilir. Bunlardan herbiri ancak Alpli tiple 
temasa geldikten ve onun yaratıcı ve yükseltici dehası ile kaynaştıktan 
sonradır ki yeni bir uyanışla ince ve yüksek medeni mahsuller veren 
unsurlar haline gelebilmişlerdir.57   
 
The official Turkish history project was launched in 1928 with the initiative of 
Atatürk. Afet İnan, one of the main promoters of the project recounts the origin of the 
project in the following manner: 
   Fransız coğrafya kitaplarının birinde, Türk ırkının Sarı Irk’a mensup 
olduğu ve Avrupa zihniyetine göre ikinci nevi bir insan tipi olduğu yazılı 
idi. Kendisine [Atatürk] gösterdim. ‘Bu böyle midir?’ dedim. ‘Hayır, 
olmaz, bunun üzerinde meşgul olalım. Sen çalış.’ dediler.58  
 
 Atatürk is known to have made the following comment in the same year: “Turks 
could not have built an empire in Anatolia as a tribe. This should have another 
explanation. The science of history should reveal that”.59 These two events are 
important not only in providing a rough starting date for the efforts directed at the 
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creation of an official national history, but also in that they promote a myth of the 
process itself –augmenting what we might call the cult of the leader. The papers of the 
Congress abound in examples of such a mystification of the person of the leader; 
Atatürk is frequently envisaged as a semi-God, making possible the undertaking of great 
tasks by the men of the new regime, such as the writing of the national history and the 
convention of the Congress. Only his presence makes possible -and provides adequate 
motivation for- the writing of the national history.     
 On April 20, 1930, in the last convention of the Türk Ocakları –a civil 
organization founded with the intention of promoting research in the history and the 
language of Turks-, Afet İnan proposed the establishment of a standing committee 
devoted to the scientific investigation of Turkish history and civilization; the proposal 
was accepted.60 This committee –Türk Tarihi Tetkik Heyeti- hastily undertook the 
compilation of a volume on national history. Within a couple of months the first 
paradigmatic text of the official history thesis was completed and published, Türk 
Tarihinin Ana Hatları. In the first page of this book, the aim of the writing of national 
history was stated as follows: 
   Şimdiye kadar memleketimizde neşrolunan tarih kitaplarının çoğunda 
ve onlara mehaz olan Fransızca tarih kitaplarında Türklerin dünya 
tarihindeki rolleri şuurlu veya şuursuz olarak küçültülmüştür. Türklerin, 
ecdat hakkında böyle yanlış malûmat alması, Türklüğün kendini 
tanımasında, benliğini inkişaf ettirmesinde zararlı olmuştur. Bu kitapla 
istihdaf olunan asıl gaye, bugün bütün dünyada tabii mevkiini istirdat 
eden ve bu şuurla yaşayan miletimiz için zararlı olan bu hataların 
tashihine çalışmaktır; aynı zamanda bu, son büyük hadiselerle ruhunda 
benlik ve birlik duygusu uyanan Türk milleti için milli bir tarih yazmak 
ihtiyacı yönünde atılmış ilk adımdır.61  
 
 This book was published in only one hundred copies and these were distributed 
to certain historians and intellectuals for reviewing. Though the book was narrowly 
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distributed and extensively criticized and the project of turning this book into a textbook 
in the future never materialized, we still cannot dismiss this book as an unsuccessful 
undertaking for two main reasons: some of the most critical ideas put forth in this book 
became part of the official history thesis without revision; and a shorter version of the 
book –comprising primarily the parts on Central Asia- was published in thirty thousand 
copies and distributed in schools by the Ministry of National Education in the beginning 
of 1931.62 
 On April 15 of 1931, Türk Ocakları dissolved itself; and the name of the Tarih 
Tetkik Heyeti –which used to be an extension of Türk Ocakları- was changed into Türk 
Tarih Tetkik Cemiyeti and it was brought under the control of the government. Etienne 
Copeaux considers this date to be a turning point in intellectual life of early Republican 
Turkey, signifying the absolute control of the government thereafter.63 Though the 
claim is valid, it is nonetheless somewhat unqualified. There was a certain amount of 
government control over the intellectual life, but to assume that it was absolute would 
be an overstatement. What was also important was that it was in the interests of the 
Turkish intelligentsia of the period to foster theories congruent with those propounded 
by the state. Those two are quite different claims, maybe not in effect but in style. Yet, 
this should not be taken to mean that the state did not actively manipulate and, to a large 
extent, shape the development of Turkish nationalism. Political action supplied a further 
set of limits on the development of historical theories –in addition to those discussed 
above. If it did not do anything else, the Republic, at least, confined Turkish nationalism 
to the official borders of the new state –through its emphasis on Misak-ı Milli borders 
(limiting the territory of the state mainly to Anatolia and Eastern Thrace) or through 
forcing Türk Ocakları into focusing their work only on the Turks of Anatolia.64   
 The first project of this society was the production of a textbook for high school 
students; and almost miraculously four volumes were ready for print by the end of July, 
signifying the urgency the ruling elites ascribed to the production of standardized 
textbooks of national history.65 
 At the end of the school year (June 1932), the First Turkish History Congress 
was convened in Ankara with the initiative of the Ministry of Education and of Atatürk, 
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in order to popularize the official history thesis, to revise the history textbooks which 
have been in use for a year; and to familiarize the high school teachers with the methods 
of modern history education and basic tenets of this new discourse of national history. 
Given this purpose, the overwhelming majority of the participants were teachers from 
secondary schools; the exact distribution of the participants was as follows: 198 
secondary school teachers, 18 university professors or assistants, and 25 members of the 
Türk Tarihi Tetkik Cemiyeti –most of which were also members of the parliament. 
Only 33 of these participants took active part in the discussions, while only 15 of them 
presented papers.66 The Congress represented the culmination of the official history 
thesis, which had developed over the last three years and which would officially 
dominate Turkish historiography for at least until the end of the decade and history 
education almost from thereafter. The quotation below taken from the opening speech 
of the Minister of Education, Esat Bey, delivered at the Congress, provides an overview 
the thesis: 
   Türkler anayurtları olan Ortaasiyada Yontmataş devrinini milattan 
12000 sene evel geçirdikleri halde Avrupalılar ancak 5000 sene daha 
sonra bu devirden kurtulabilmişlerdir. Diğer taraflarda insanlar henüz 
ağaç ve kaya kovuklarında yaşarken Türkler Ortaasiyada kereste ve 
maden medeniyetini meydana getirmişler, hayvanları ehlileştirmişler, 
çiftçiliğe başlamışlardı. Cilalıtaş devrine tesadüf eden Cümudiye devri 
sonlarında buzların çekilmesile vukua gelen mühim tabiî tahavvüller 
sebebile bir çok Türk kabileleri muhacerete başladı. Bu suretle milattan 
7000 sene kadar evel çiftçilik ve çobanlığı ilerletmiş ve altın, bakır, kalay 
ve demiri keşfetmiş olan Türkler Ortaasiyadan yayıldıktan sonra gittikleri 
yerlerde ilk medeniyeti neşretmiş ve böylece Asiyada Çin, Hint ve 
Mukaddes Yurt edindikleri Anadolu’da Eti, Mezopotamyada Sumer, 
Elâm ve nihayet Mısır, Akdeniz ve Roma medeniyetlerinin esaslarını 
kurmuşlar ve bugün yüksek medeniyetlerini takdir ve takip ettiğimiz 
Avrupayı o zaman mağara hayatından kurtarmışlardır.67 
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 “Though the Turks have left behind the Paleolithic Age by 12000 BC in their 
homeland, Central Asia, the Europeans were saved from this stage only 5000 years 
later. While in other parts of the world, men were still living in trees and caves, the 
Turks had already developed a civilization of timber and metal, domesticated animals 
and started farming.  Many Turkic tribes began to migrate due to grave natural 
transformations that took place as a result of the receding of the glaciers at the end of 
the Ice Age, which coincided with the Neolithic Age. In this manner, the Turks who had 
advanced farming and shepherding and discovered gold, copper, tin and iron about 7000 
BC, spread out from Central Asia and diffused the first civilization in the places they 
went; and thus founded the basis of Chinese and Indian civilizations in Asia, the Hittite 
civilization in Anatolia which they adopted as their Holy Homeland, the Sumerian 
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 Afet İnan summarized the thesis in an article written in 1939 in the following 
manner: 
   Türk çocuğu… yakın bir tarihte göç etmiş olmakla bu vatanın hakikî 
sahibi olamaz. Bu fikir tarihen, ilmen yanlıştır. Türk brakisefal ırkı 
Anadolu’da ilk devlet kuran bir millettir. Bu ırkın kültür yurdu ilk 
zamanlarda, iklimi müsait olan Orta Asya’da idi. İklim tabiî şartlar 
dahilinde değişti. Taşı cilalamayı bulan, ziraat hayatına erişen, 
madenlerden istifadeyi keşfeden bu halk kütlesi, göç etmeye mecbur 
kaldı. Orta Asya’dan şarka, cenuba, garpte Hazer Denizinin şimal ve 
cenubuna olmak üzere yayıldı. Gittikleri yerlere yerleştiler, kültürlerini 
oralarda kurdular. Bazı mıntıkalarda otokton oldular, bazılarında otokton 
olan diğer bir ırk ile karıştılar. Avrupa’da tesadüf ettikleri ırk tipi 
dolikosefal idi. Irak, Anadolu, Mısır, Ege medeniyetlerinin ilk kurucuları 
Orta Asyalı brakisefal ırkın mümessilleridir. Biz bugünkü Türkler de 
onların çocuklarıyız. İşte Atatürk’ün tarih tezi kısaca böyle hulasa 
edilebilir.68    
 
 In the same essay, Afet İnan recounts Atatürk calling those who do not support 
this thesis as “some non-believers” in his death-bed69; this shows not only the emotional 
investment of the elite in the project and the importance ascribed to its success, but also 
provides an example of nationalist discourse assimilating elements of religious 
discourse –having doubts about the glorious history of the nation has the same gravity 
as having doubts about the existence of God once had.           
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
civilization in Mesopotamia and finally Egyptian, Mediterranean and Roman 
civilizations; and saved Europe, whose advanced civilization we appreciate and pursue 
today, from a life in caves then.” BTTK, p. 6. 
68
 “The Turkish children…cannot be the authentic owners of this homeland by having 
migrated here in the near past. This idea is historically and scientifically erroneous. The 
Turkish brachycephalous race is the first nation that has founded a state in Anatolia. The 
cultural homeland of this race was Central Asia which had a suitable climate at first. 
The climate changed due to natural causes. This population, which had discovered how 
to polish the stone and to make use of the metals and had reached agricultural life, was 
forced to migrate. It spread out from Central Asia to East and South and to the north and 
south of the Caspian Sea in the West. They settled where they went and founded their 
cultures there. In some places, they became autochthon, while in some they intermixed 
with another autochthon race. The race they encountered in Europe was 
dolichocephalous. The founders of Iraqi, Anatolian, Egyptian and Aegean civilizations 
were representatives of the Central Asian brachycephalous race. We, the Turks of today, 
are their children. This is how the history thesis of Atatürk can be summarized in short.”     
İnan, “Atatürk ve Tarih Tezi”, pp. 245-6. 
69
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2. Formation of Nations: from Ethnic Categories to Nations 
 
 
According to Smith, as the nations are built on ethnic communities, so are the 
ethnic communities dependent on “ethnic categories”. He states that ethnic categories 
exhibit a very limited amount of self-awareness or no self-awareness at all. Then as an 
example of an ethnic category, he provides the Turks of Anatolia prior to 1900. He 
claims that they were not yet aware of a distinct Turkish identity, one which could be 
differentiated from a dominant Ottoman or Islamic identity, or one which could 
outweigh the local identities pertaining to kin, village or region. Among them “a myth 
of common origins, shared historical memories, a sense of solidarity or an association 
with a designated homeland [was] largely absent”.70  If we remember the elements that 
go into the making of ethnic communities, we will see that the Turks of Anatolia –
according to Smith- lacked four out of six of them: they only had a collective name and 
at least one differentiating element of common culture. How were they to develop 
within a quarter of a century from an ethnic category to a nation: Smith provides no 
clear answer to that. Even if we assume that Smith was exaggerating the situation of the 
Turks, there still remains enough reason to believe that the Turkish ethnic identity did 
go through a tremendous amount of reconstruction in the first quarter of the 20th 
century. For instance, Georgeon claims that the period between 1908 and 1914 was very 
crucial in the development of Turkish nationalism: it was within the span of this short 
period that Turkish nationalism transformed from a loosely held collection of beliefs 
and ideas held by a handful of writers and intellectuals into a well-formed, solid 
ideology. Most of the constructive work that went into making such a big leap in such a 
short time –at least in the cultural sphere- was involved with myth-making.  
While insisting on the persistence of cultural identity to a large extent, Smith 
nonetheless enumerates certain traumatic events which might lead to changes in that 
identity –largely by way of necessitating and producing new myths that could make 
sense of the new situations in which the community finds itself: they include “war and 
conquest, exile and enslavement, the influx of immigrants and religious conversion”.71 
The Turks definitely suffered from prolonged warfare in the first quarter of the century; 
and meanwhile kept receiving immigrants from the former territories of the old empire 
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–according to Georgeon the number of Muslims seeking refuge in the Ottoman Empire 
was measured in millions.72 Moreover, official secularism of the new state could lead to 
consequences resembling those of religious conversion. In short, there was no wonder 
that the first quarter of the century provided fertile ground for the construction and/or 
transformation of the Turkish nation. Among those traumatic events, probably the most 
important was prolonged warfare. Smith claims that warfare has a central role in the 
formation of nations, “as a mobilizer of ethnic sentiments and national consciousness, a 
centralizing force in the life of the community and a provider of myths and memories 
for future generations”.73 No doubt that Balkan Wars, the Great War and the War of 
Independence contributed a great deal to the formation of the Turkish nation.  
In Smith’s typology of nation formation, there are two kinds of ethnies: lateral 
and vertical. The first one consists of an aristocratic culture; the ruling class has no 
intention to diffuse its own culture throughout the society it rules, because this culture 
provides the basis of their position as rulers. The second is demotic; such ethnies have 
more compact boundaries and greater social depth in comparison to lateral ones.74 In the 
framework provided by Smith, the lateral ethnies develop into territorial-civic nations 
by way of bureaucratic incorporation; while the vertical ethnies develop into ethnic-
genealogical nations by way of vernacular mobilization. Actually the names speak for 
themselves, yet if we need to go over them in brief: the first case is concerned with a 
ruling elite, imposing its culture on the lower classes through the use of the state 
apparatus it controls and the loyalty is primarily to the land and citizenship is the 
overriding identity; territorial nationalism regards “the nation as a form of rational 
association”.75 In the second case, an intelligentsia mobilizes an ethnic community 
through references to the national language and creates a solidarity based on myths of 
ethnic origin, common ancestry and ethnic identity; ethnic nationalism imagines the 
nation as a community of culture and history with a bond of solidarity that resembles 
the familial bond”.76  Yet, it is important to emphasize that these two nationalisms are 
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not mutually exclusive. Actually, neither are the two types of ethnies on which they 
depend. For instance, Smith argues that the Turks formed primarily a lateral ethnie 
which also included demotic elements.77 Following that line of argument, the Turkish 
nation is basically a territorial-civic nation, which comprises certain elements of ethnic-
genealogical ones. In principle, the Turkish nation is based on territorial nationalism –
created through the homogenization of an originally heterogeneous population by way 
of bureaucratic incorporation. Yet it also harvests myths of ethnic origin and tries to 
simulate a familial bond among its members.   
 
 
1. Formation of Non-European Territorial-Civic Nations: The Case of Turkey 
 
The formation of territorial-civic nations outside Europe can be examined under 
two headings: imperial and colonial. Turkey is an example of the first route. These 
ethnies lived under states that were at least formally independent, which meant that –as 
Breuilly has also argued- a transformation of both the political system and the cultural 
identity was necessary. These imperial states had four characteristics: they were 
dominated by an aristocratic culture –a lateral ethnie; they included significant ethnic 
minorities; their bureaucratic states were of a modernizing character; and they 
frequently made use of official and institutional nationalism.78 The Turkish case 
satisfies all these criteria. The story goes like this: the ruling class tries to assimilate the 
ethnic minorities and strengthen their control over society by way of transforming the 
people into a homogenous nation. According to Breuilly, the tendency is to first take 
over the control of the state and then push through “a national revolution from above”.79 
Hence, the importance of bureaucracy and the state apparatus in the formation of the 
national identity. The bureaucratic state diffuses the culture of the lateral ethnie “down 
the social scale and into the countryside and inner-city areas, displacing the hold of 
ecclesiastical authorities and local notables”.80 Their foremost instrument in this attempt 
is a nationalistic educational program; “to this end, they promote official, established 
ideas and images of the nation, to which everyone must conform and which preclude the 
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rise of any other ideas, symbols or imagery.”81 The First Turkish History Congress –as 
the culmination and the symbol of the effort to produce a national/official history- 
provides a good example in this regard; it was definitely an attempt at the creation of 
such “established ideas and images of the nation”. It was also definitely aiming at an 
intellectual monopoly; the “apologetic” tone of all the criticisms voiced in the Congress 
proves that point.82 The ultimate success of the Congress is a whole different issue. 
Smith argues that the success of official nationalism is mainly dependent on two 
factors: geopolitical and social. The transformation is swifter and more successful 
where the dominant ethnie and its rulers can find ways “to divest themselves of their 
imperial heritage, usually by redrawing their borders”.83 The new Turkish state was 
lucky in this regard; by the time of its formation, it was divested of most of the former 
Empire’s ethnic minorities. Those they still had, they took care of by way of policies 
like the exchange of populations with Greece. The new state distanced itself from the 
former empire not only in terms of demography, but also took measures to repudiate its 
heritage. This brings us to the second factor: the transformation was more rapid and 
effective “to the extent that the old ruling aristocracy has been replaced…by middle and 
lower classes, whilst simultaneously preserving and adapting their cultural heritage” and 
“too sharp a repudiation of that heritage” could build up “problems of cultural and 
political identity for the future”.84 The new Turkish state could not be considered very 
successful in this regard; for almost all possible measures were taken to sever all ties 
with the Ottoman Empire in terms of cultural identity and social and political 
organization. Such a thoroughgoing transformation could not be effected in such a short 
time and without damage to the identity and the integrity of those that formed the nation 
–at least in the long-run. It is probably such a retrospective examination of its level of 
success that leads Smith to claim that “the content, if not the form, of Turkish national 
identity proved elusive”.85 
The civic-territorial nations thus formed by non-European nationalists have four 
main characteristics that stand out: territorialism; participation; citizenship; civic 
education. Among these four, the first and the last prove more important for our current 
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purposes. By territorialism, Smith means a political commitment to –and an emotional 
investment in- particular boundaries –without any regard to how they might have been 
formed. The contingency of the existing boundaries –be they of colonial origin or result 
of wars and political settlements- should be turned into a destiny; “the patria must 
become an historical territory”. To this end, it is legitimate to take pride in the glory of 
former civilizations that inhabited the same territory with the nation-state and 
appropriate them in order to enhance the cultural standing of the nation.86 The 
appropriation of the Hittite past of Anatolia can be a case in point. Yet, we should keep 
in mind that in the Turkish case, there was always a blending of territorial and 
genealogical elements; thus, the Hittites were also claimed to be Turks.  
The other important characteristic of the civic-territorial nations is their 
emphasis on civic education. It is only through an education of “civic” character that the 
solidarity of such a nation could be accomplished. Civic education is “as much for the 
benefit of the national community as for the individual” and “there is far greater 
emphasis on the service to the community that the individual can provide and the debt 
that he or she incurs”.87 We can see examples of this prioritization of the interests of the 
nation over those of the individual and constant references to the “debt” one has to 
his/her nation and the “services” he/she can provide to settle that debt in the papers 
presented in the First Turkish History Congress. To give some examples: “Tarih 
tedrisinde birinci vazifemiz milli tezin mahfuziyetidir. Milli tezimizi çürütecek 
mevzulardan uzak kalmak her birimiz için, muallim için, talebe için milli ve vatani bir 
mükellefiyettir.”88 Or: “Cumhuriyet sistemimizin, milli ahlak ve terbiyemizin, milli 
vahdet ve hakimiyetimizin neslimizden beklediği vazifeler inkılap borcumuzdur.”89   
This education may be utilized “to convey through language …history, the arts 
and literature a political mythology and symbolism of the new nation…that will 
legitimate its novel, even revolutionary, directions”90; exactly the aim of the Congress 
and the official history thesis which it propounded. We can see what the state expected 
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to achieve through implementing a standardized program of national history education 
and how this was connected to the construction of the nation, in the opening speech 
delivered by the Minister of Education, Esat Bey, who summarized lucidly not only the 
aims of the Congress and of the reform in education they were trying to undertake, but 
also how history could be utilized in legitimizing the current state of political and social 
life and the changes taking place in it –however drastic those changes might be: 
   Millet bir harstan olan insanlardan mürekkep bir cemiyet olduğuna 
göre harstaki birliğin tesisi için bütün hars ilimlerinin başında gelen 
tarihin bu noktadaki ehemmiyetini daha ziyade tefsile lüzum görmem. 
   Sözümü bitirmeden evel tarih tedrisatından beklenilen faydalardan 
bilhassa milli kültürün mesnedi olan milli terbiye hakkında da bir iki 
kelime arzına müsadelerinizi rica ederim. Bununla ana baba ocağında 
olduğu gibi mektep sıralarında da çocuklarımızın dimağlarında ve 
kalplerinde sarsılmaz bir kanaat ve iman halinde yerleşmesi lazım gelen 
Cümhuriyet devri ahlak ve terbiye telakkilerinin ve Cümhuriyet 
sistemimizin esaslarının derin ve şerefli mazimizden kök ve kuvvet 
aldığını ve ahlak ve terbiyede milli his, milli ahlak, milli terbiyenin ve 
Cümhuriyet sistemimizde milli vahdet ve milli hakimiyetin ve ferdi hak 
ve hürriyetin esas teşkil eylediğini bu vesile ile de tekrarlamak isterim. 
Bunlar bizim medeni esaslarla daima takviye edeceğimiz milli ve tarihi 
seciyelerimizdir. Türklerde devlet teşkilatının kuvvetli bir merkez 
hakimiyeti ile halkçılık esasını telif fikrine istinat ettiğini ve mülkiyet 
hakkı ile nikaha müstenit bir aile sisteminin Türklerde tarihten evelki 
devirlerde teessüs etmiş olduğunu tarihin birinci kitabında ve Türklerin 
milli ve tarihi seciyeleri arasında okuyoruz. Daima hür doğmuş ve hür 
yaşamış olan Türk, eskiden beri kendi menfaatini milletin menfaatinde 
görmüş ve her müşkül karşısında asla geri çekilmeyerek büyük bir azim, 
metanet ve sabırla hedefine varmaya muvaffak olmuştur. Milli 
terbiyemizde esas olan milliyetçilik, devletçilik ve halkçılık işte hep bu 
milli ve tarihi seciyelerimizden doğmuştur.91 
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 “Since the nation is a community composed of people of the same culture, the 
importance of history, which is primary among all cultural sciences, in the 
establishment of unity in culture needs no further explanation. 
Before finishing my speech, I request your permission to present a couple of words 
about one of the expected uses of history teaching in particular, that is the national 
upbringing which is the basis of national culture. I want to use this opportunity to 
restate that the view of morals and manners of the Republican era and the basic 
principles of our Republican system, which should be established as an unwavering idea 
and faith in the minds and the hearts of our children in school as well as at hearth, take 
root and strength from our deep and honorable past; and that national sentiment, 
national morals and national manners form the basis of morals and manners and 
national unity, national sovereignty and individual rights and liberties form the basis of 
our Republican system. These are our national and historical characteristics which we 
will always reinforce with civilized principles. We learn from the first volume of the 
history book and under the national and historical characteristics of the Turks that the 
state organization of the Turks depends on the idea of combining a strong central 
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The matter at hand was understood to be much greater in scope than deciding the 
contents of the textbooks. The compilation of standardized national history textbooks 
was an integral part of a bigger project of transformation in social life aimed by the 
intellectuals and the ruling elite alike. The aspiration was to create a community which 
would imagine itself as a nation and be bound together by strong national sentiments; 
and which would at the same time feel itself to be the historical and original source of 
the main principles of the new regime, thus providing legitimation for the changes 
carried out by the ruling elite. In this framework, the basic tenets of the new political 
organization –like étatism, nationalism and populism- which were all modern 
constructs, were anachronistically naturalized and normalized with reference to an 
underlying authentic Turkish identity.  
Moreover, the participants regarded history writing as an important political act. 
They were intent on the idea that writing national history was a part of nation building, 
as well as an act of liberation and a sign of independence. The political successes of the 
new Republic had to be complemented by developments in national historiography. An 
example of this line of thought can be seen in Fuat Köprülü’s following comments:  
   Dünyada her millet ne kadar maddi istiklaline malik olmak 
mecburiyetinde ise, aynı derecei ehemmiyette olarak manevi istiklaline 
de malik olmak mecburiyetindedir. 
   Gazi’nin…teşvikile başlayan milli tarihimizi yeniden yaratmak 
faaliyeti bizde de maddi kurtuluştan sonar bir manevi kurtuluş 
mücadelesine başlandığını gösteriyor.92  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
sovereignty with the principle of populism; and that property rights and a family system 
dependent on marriage were established among the Turks in prehistoric times. The 
Turks, who have at all times been free in birth and in life, have always seen their 
personal interests in the interest of the nation and have succeeded in reaching their goals 
with great resolution, tenacity and endurance, never retreating in the face of any 
obstacles. Nationalism, étatism and populism which form the basis of our national 
upbringing all derive from those national and historical characteristics of ours.”BTTK, 
p. 12-3.  
92
“The requirement of possessing moral independence is of the same degree of 
importance as that of possessing material independence for every nation of the world.  
The activity of re-creating our national history which has started with the 
encouragement of the Ghazi (Atatürk) shows that following the material emancipation, 
a struggle for moral emancipation has also started here.” BTTK, p. 47. 
  
 
33 
3. Myths and National Sentiments 
 
 
   Vital for any nation is the growth and spread of a ‘national sentiment’ 
outwards from the centre and usually downwards through the strata of the 
population. It is in and through the myths and symbols of the common 
past that such a national sentiment finds its expression.93 
 
The national sentiment is the stuff of the four subjective elements that go into 
the making of ethnic communities, and in turn that of the nation; and that sentiment is to 
a large extent the effect of the national myths. Smith talks about what one might call a 
meta-myth that is of great importance for the nations and that occupies a central place in 
myth-making: he calls it “the myth of ethnic origins”. There are two types of this myth: 
the first one is that of genealogical ancestry, which is based on biology and ensures a 
high level of solidarity among the people that make up the nation by way of defining it 
as a familial bond dependent on blood relations; the second one is that of ideological 
descent, which is cultural and ideological in character and is based on the persistence a 
particular kind of virtue or ideal throughout generations –that is, an ideological 
heritage.94 These two types coincide with the two types of ethnies –vertical and lateral- 
and the corresponding types of nations – ethnic-genealogical and territorial-civic- 
discussed above. The myths of ethnic descent that the Turkish nationalists embraced 
were both genealogical and ideological. 
Historically, ethnic myths emerge in three junctures in the life of a community. 
The first one is prolonged warfare –which we have mentioned before, drawing attention 
to its role in the formation of the Turkish nation. The second one is incipient 
commercialization leading to the termination of the society’s isolation and to its 
integration into a global economic network, in which it is confronted by cultures of 
greater wealth and superior technology. From a world-system perspective, this can be 
rephrased as the integration of a nation-state into the capitalist world system as a 
periphery or semi-periphery. The last, and probably the most important one, is 
“incipient secularization or its threat, as the nub of a wider clash of cultures, usually 
between a technologically superior, more “rationalistic civilization and a more 
traditional backward one, a clash that divides the community over the value of its 
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tradition today”.95 Since there is a great amount of theory linking nationalism to religion 
and since religion has an important place in understanding the Turkish case, we will 
examine it in more detail.  
 
 
1. Religion, Secularism and Nationalism 
 
The traces of the clash mentioned above can be seen in the papers of the First 
Turkish History Congress as the speakers try to give new meaning to a world, which 
they had spent so much time to disenchant by way of totally severing its ties with 
religion; and to assure themselves and others of the worth of their authentic traditions. 
The paper presented by Afet İnan can provide a case in point. She openly embraced the 
theory of evolution and argued that man was the last chain of an evolutionary progress 
beginning with fish; thus taking away the creative power ascribed to God and 
undermining the authority of Islam.96 They were in effect trying to legitimize the 
revolutionary aspects of the new regime, which included, among other things, a 
devotion to a thorough secularization of both the political and the socio-cultural realm.  
As was mentioned above, nationalism came up the historical stage in a period 
when belief in a divine order was on the decline and it was this lack of trust in the ways 
of the world that the nationalist sentiments compensated for. It was –and, to a large 
extent, still is- only through the myths of ethnic descent, that individuals and 
collectivities alike could begin to make sense of the displacements and relocations 
affected by the rise of the bureaucratic state and the decline of religion and reorient 
themselves in what seemed to be foreign territory. Gellner claims that advanced 
industrial societies are, by definition, devoted “to a theory of knowledge which makes 
nature intelligible without recourse to Revelation and thus also renders nature 
effectively manipulable and a source ever-growing affluence”.97  
Yet, in the Turkish case –like in many other cases of non-Western nationalism-, 
the nation does not rise in order to fill the void left by the already declining religion. 
There is a model of nationalism –which has become the norm as a source of political 
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legitimation-, which in its original form followed from the demise of religious beliefs 
and was secular in character. The new states, reflecting on their backwardness in 
comparison to the modern nation states of the West, find themselves in a crisis of belief 
in their own traditional values, including religion. Thus, in cases like Turkey, 
secularism –and the “demise” of religion- follows, or at least parallels, the rise of 
nationalism and not the other way around. The official –and sometimes oppressive- 
imposition of secularism on the society as a criteria of modernization, leads to a crisis in 
identity and a loss of collective capacity to make meaning out of life. In this case, 
nationalism provides “an identity and a purpose for those compelled (or tempted?) by 
modernization to abandon tradition”.98  
The role of the intellectuals in the creation of such an identity crisis should not 
be underestimated, as Weber links the drive for meaning itself with the rise of 
intellectualism. Accordingly, “it is the intellectual who transforms the concept of the 
world into the problem of meaning”; as the intellectuals destroy “the belief in magic, the 
world’s processes become disenchanted, lose their magical significance and henceforth 
simply ‘are’ and ‘happen’ but no longer signify anything”.99 Again, an example from 
Afet İnan’s speech can prove meaningful, for she argued that life was simply a result of 
chemistry and physics.100 If life is only chemistry and physics then it does not signify 
anything; hence the need for re-enchantment. Myths of ethnic descent re-enchant this 
world by way of “placing the present in the context of the past”, thus providing a sense 
of security through the construction of “new identities that seem to be also very 
old”.101According to Deniz Kandiyoti, this is central to nationalism, which “presents 
itself both as a modern project that melts and transforms traditional attachments in favor 
of new identities and as a reflection of authentic cultural values culled from the depths 
of a presumed communal past”.102  
These myths of ethnic descent fabricate an illusion of a nation which had always 
been and will always be there. The sense of continuity thus created, gives meaning to 
the otherwise meaningless life and death of the individuals through the promise of 
collective immortality. Here lies the source of nationalism’s true appeal. In this context, 
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one might argue that “the formation of nations and the rise of ethnic nationalism appear 
more like the institutionalization of a ‘surrogate religion’ than a political ideology”.103 
In principle, religion and nationalism work in similar ways. Both start from the 
individual and go on to constitute a specific form of community with its distinctive 
system of social morality.104 Nationalism succeeds in replacing –and in some cases 
supplementing- religion, because it works with the same principle: it creates men. It 
resolves the identity crisis brought along by modernity, by way of supplying each men 
with an identity of his own which is at the same time part of a collective identity and 
which links him with a meaningful unity beyond his individual existence. The crisis that 
leads men to seek meaning in life is individual in character, but it can be resolves only 
within a collectivity -the community of believers or the nation; for although all identity 
is individual, there is no identity which is not at the same time historical and social.105  
These explain the affinity between the language of religion and of nationalism 
and the narrative strategies that aim to sanctify the nation by way of treating it as if it 
was in fact a religion. Here, the “theological discourse works as a model for the 
idealization of the nation and the sacralization of the state”.106 The examples of how the 
narration of the nation could take on a religious quality can also be seen in the papers of 
the First Turkish History Congress; for instance, the frequent use of the imagery of light 
vs. dark. One should keep in mind that most of the participants of the Congress were 
brought up in a cultural environment in which religion was still the primary instrument 
in making life legible.  
Moreover, the secularization in Turkey was far swifter than many other cases 
and to a large extent engineered and imposed from above; all the more reason why, 
people needed to construct a religious faith out of the new nation. This constitutes 
another aspect of the affinity between religion and nationalism. Since people who were 
brought up with a certain religious understanding of life and of world, could not switch 
at once to a world-view which did not depend on Revelation for its legitimacy; they 
tried to fit the new ‘faith’ –the civic religion- into their old framework of religious faith. 
Their way of relating to the new faith was naturally modeled on their relation to the old 
one. Their belief in the nation was a reflection of their belief in God –as the ultimate 
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provider of all meaning and the omnipotent legitimator of all truth and all action. 
Hence, it was only natural for the first generation Republicans to be “fundamentalist, 
rigid, uncompromising, scholastic” in their nationalism.107 The Turkish nationalists 
were in effect trying to construct a new system of faith based on the triad of nation, state 
and leader. This is somewhat similar to what Gellner means when he claims that the 
commitment of Turkish nation to modernization initially had “an Ottoman and a 
Koranic quality”.108 In the Turkish case, like in many other reform nationalisms, 
modernization was almost synonymous with nationalism. This new faith –in modernity 
and progress and in the capacity of nationalism to achieve these ends-, in a similar 
fashion to the old religion, was “linked to the state” providing its legitimation and, in 
turn, being itself justified in proportion to “the strength which it bestow[ed] on the 
state”.109  
As was mentioned before, the nationalist imagination resembles religious 
imaginings. This is a marked characteristic of the Turkish nationalism. Religion was the 
one of the main loci of power and legitimation against which the new regime had to 
position itself. Naturally, the sovereign nation imagined by and for that regime would 
have to be outside and above religion –if not directly opposed to it. One of the primary 
aims of the official Turkish history thesis (and of the larger project of nation-formation) 
that the Congress was trying to affirm and approve of, was to shift the focus of faith 
from a system centered on God to one that was secular and national. The early 
Republican nationalism was striving hard to keep religion and religious thought, which 
were regarded as guilty of the failures of the old regime, out of the newly imagined 
national life.  
 
 
2. Functions of Myths 
 
The three conjunctures discussed above, leading to the emergence of new myths, 
are times of crisis in terms of legitimacy. The primary function of all myths –if we 
regard them from a functionalist, Durkheimian view- is to legitimate the social and 
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moral structure of a society and to reaffirm the identity of the people.110 When there is a 
transformation in any one of these fields, new myths will be required. Myth-making is 
necessarily a continuous project; the “national story… must be continually recreated, 
modified and defended”.111 Myths provide the essence of the identity of the nation. 
They do not need to be true –even believed to be true-, what matters is their symbolic 
power in producing, reproducing and defining the nation.112 This power is predicated 
upon their success in producing the effect and/or the illusion of a natural –even 
“commonsensical”- sense of historical attachment to a geographical territory marked 
and shaped by collective memory113; that is, in naturalizing and normalizing 
membership to a nation, hence prioritizing the loyalty to and identification with the 
nation over all else. Moreover, myths seek to create an intellectual monopoly by way of 
presenting themselves as the only ways of ordering the world.114 It is through the 
sharing of such a mindset, that the members of a community identify with each other 
and produce monolithic responses in times of crises.   
Smith breaks down his ‘meta-myth- of the ethnic descent into its component 
myths –while underlining the fact that all national myths will include some unique 
elements in addition to this general framework. Before going on any further, it is 
necessary to draw attention to the importance of history –and its complementary 
disciplines, archaeology, anthropology and philology- in the making of these myths.  
 
 
3. Myth-making and Historical Sciences 
 
It is as if the main task of the nationalist historian is to contribute first to the 
formation and then to the reproduction of such myths. Their scientific –or in some 
cases, pseudo-scientific- findings are integrated into myths, which become the carriers 
of the national history on the popular level. Both history and myths feed into each other 
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ad infinitum. The formation of a nation always requires history to be turned into ethnic 
myths.115 This brings us to the crucial role of the nationalist historians in the 
construction of national identity: they supply myth-making with the material it requires. 
In this regard, the First Turkish History Congress and the official history thesis cannot 
be evaluated as purely academic undertakings; they were aimed at nothing less than the 
creation of the new myths necessitated by the new national identity, which was itself 
being simultaneously constructed. Any form of collective identity, including national 
identity, is predicated on the presence of a collective past; it is through this past that 
human communities come to know themselves. The national history provides the 
mirror-image -which is so crucial in the development of individual identity- for the 
nation. In this line of argument, national history is indispensable for national identity; 
and what the official history does is to basically provide the members of the nation with 
an image that they would like to identify with.116  
The discipline of archaeology also has close ties with the process of myth-
making. According to Smith, the underlying purpose of this discipline is “to reconstruct 
a past era or civilization and relate it to later periods, including the present”.117 This 
relation between historical periods is established primarily by way of dating –and of 
arranging in a chronology. Chronology is the reflection of a world-view that binds the 
past, the present and the future in a linear succession. The periodization thus achieved, 
contributes to the sense of continuity that is so vital to the national sentiment. This sense 
of continuity renders the flux of history manageable through an intellectual framework 
which gives the people’s history coherence and design”.118 Thus, in dating relics, the 
archaeologist determines the location of “the community in its historic time and in that 
sense provides a symbolic and cognitive basis or foundation for that community”; that 
is, he “reconstructs the modern community by altering its temporal perspective and self-
view”.119 The archaeologist fixes the location of the community not only in terms of 
time but also of space. Moreover, he helps preserve the glories of these past epochs –
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which also translate into potentialities for the future. These are all very important tasks 
not only for the making but also for the reproduction and possible verification of myths 
as will be clearer as we talk about various types of myths below. One further point 
needs emphasis: archaeology does all these “in the name of, and through the use of, 
modern science”, which is the ultimate legitimator of the modern age.120 This scientific 
quality of archaeology is often utilized to provide an aura of truth to the myths of the 
nation. This is one of the most emphasized aspects of archaeology throughout the 
papers of the Congress.           
The discipline of philology is crucial in establishing authenticity –its common 
aim with myths of ethnic descent. It traces “linguistic descent and origins to reveal what 
was intrinsic to the pure, authentic language group”.121 Hence, it provides a parallel 
narrative to the myths of ethnic origin, legitimating and reinforcing their claims. Yet, 
one should remember that “national languages are almost always semi-artificial 
constructs”; “they are the opposite of what national mythology supposes them to be, 
namely the primordial foundations of national culture and the matrices of the national 
mind”.122    
 
 
4. Types of Myths and Time-Space of the Nation 
 
There are six main types of national myths according to Smith. The first is a 
myth of temporal origins. If myths are a form of popular knowledge telling the nation 
about itself -and in doing so reproducing it-, one of the primary things that the nation 
needs to know about is its origins. One of the main tasks of the nationalist historian is to 
satisfy this need by dating the community’s origins so as to “locate it in time and in 
relation to other relevant communities”.123 The antiquity of the nation had to be 
established in order for the nation to take pride in its history –and consequently, itself- 
and to claim external recognition. The participants of the History Congress were trying 
to achieve both these ends. Yet, it seems that external recognition was somewhat more 
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important in the Turkish case –made more evident by the international character the 
history congress acquired in its second convention. It was as if the whole official history 
thesis was devised as a response to those who regarded the Turks as culturally inferior 
and if the self-esteem of the nation would follow from their recognition. To give an 
example on the same line of thought from the Congress, the closing comments of Yusuf 
Akçura can be utilized: 
   Tarih milli harsın temelidir, aynı zamanda tarih milletlerin cihandaki 
mevki ve şereflerini tayin eder: tarih sayesinde bir kavim yer yüzündeki 
hayat ve saadet hakkının hiccetlerini aleme gösterir.124 
 
Etienne Copeaux is in effect pointing to the same issue by claiming that the 
Turkish history textbooks were addressed not only to their original recipients –the 
students-, but through them to a larger public –comprised of anyone who thought less of 
the Turks, especially the Europeans.125  
The second one is a myth of location and migration. This myth is 
complementary to the first one in that it locates the nation in space. The stuff of this 
myth is the homeland(s) and migration routes. This myth is associated with what Smith 
calls the “ethnoscapes”. What we are dealing with in here is the merging of a nation 
with a piece of land. The impact of the homeland in the life of the nation is threefold: at 
its simplest, it provides the stage on which the history of the nation unfolds; it has a 
more active role in that it influences not only events but also the character of the people; 
and most important of all it stands witness to the survival of the community, for it holds 
the graves of the forefathers of the nation. Through the presence of these graves, the 
homeland ensures a sense of continuity in the life of the nation -binding the dead, the 
living and the yet-unborn under a potent symbolism of the land. The creation of such a 
“homeland” is a part of the general process of “territorialization of memory”; in time 
the landscape comes to embody the memories of the nation –it is as if the history of the 
nation becomes symbolically inscribed on the land. That is how a commitment to the 
“homeland” great enough to risk death for its defense becomes possible; the individual 
identifies with the nation, which is in turn identified with the territory, thus any threat to 
the boundaries of the territory are felt by the individual members of the nation as direct 
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threats to their own person. Since it is this commitment that the new states need the 
most, it is only natural that they will “pay so much attention to inculcating love and 
veneration for particular ethnoscapes and lavish so much praise on the natural features 
of the territory they control”.126 Such a merging of the nature with the history of the 
nation results in the historicization of the nature and the naturalization of the history: by 
becoming an agent in history, the land becomes glorified; and by becoming associated 
with the nature, the history acquires a sense of being part of the natural order –in a sense 
approaches destiny. Frequently, the un-spoilt land signifies “a pure and virtuous people” 
in the nationalist imagination.  
Like all new nations, the early Turkish Republic paid close attention to 
harvesting love for the homeland. To install a sense of self-sacrifice in the nation, the 
state had to make sure to present the nation with a “homeland” with which to identify 
and in which to take pride. The route to this went first and foremost through what Smith 
calls “the national re-education of the young”, that is “a mass standardization of 
outlook, values, knowledge and skills in a nationalist framework around the trinity of 
literature, history and geography”.127 Instituting such a national education system with 
the required standardized history textbooks was one of the main goals of the First 
Turkish History Congress.  
As pressing was the need to secure the attachment of the nation to the homeland, 
it was also complicated -given the drastic changes in the boundaries of the state that 
took place over the first quarter of the century; the necessity of endowing the new 
capital (Ankara) with just enough symbolism in order for it to divest loyalty from the 
former capital (Istanbul); and the amount of myth-making which was necessarily 
involved in the transformation of a former, not-so-important territory of the empire 
(Anatolia) into a glorious and beautiful “homeland”. Esat Bey was trying to establish 
that in his closing speech:  
   Eski Anadolu hayali sıvaları dökük evleri, yıkık taşlı mezarları, yolsuz 
ve bakımsız şehirleri üstünde Sakaryalar, Kızıl ve Yeşil ırmaklar akan 
coşan sular memleketiydi. Her şehrinde, her köyünde havasını bir 
bataklık ovası zehirleyen bu yüksek yaylalar ve hırçın ırmaklar 
memleketi senelerce düşünülememiş, görülememiş, Türklüğün öz 
sevgisinden uzak ve mahrum kalmıştı.  
   Asırlarca bizi yalnız İstanbul muhabbetine bağlayan makus bir sevginin 
tesiri ile bu aziz yurdu değirmende, tarlada, cephede güneşin ve karın 
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altında çalışan saf ve güzel Anadolu köylüsüne bağışlayan bir hissin esiri 
idik.  
   Güneşinde, toprağında, rüzgarında yabancı bir nefes bulunmayan güzel 
anadolunun biricik yıldızı Ankara Türkiye Cümhuriyetinin ve Türk 
varlığının en büyük abidesidir. Eskiden Anadoluyu sevgisiz gören 
gözlerin yanlış duyan kalplerin imanını düzelten bir varlığın, büyük 
Gazinin eseri.128     
 
Moreover, the myths of location and migration were doubly important in the 
Turkish case, for the new state had not one but two homelands: an ancient homeland in 
Central Asia and the present –and hypothetically not so recent- homeland in Anatolia. 
According to Smith a geographic area can become associated with a given ethnic 
community either as the land of its origin, or as the land of its liberation and 
settlement.129 The Turkish nation has one of each. While glorifying the Central Asian 
steppes as the cradle of Turkish and the world civilization; the Turkish nationalist 
historians had to simultaneously establish the Turkish nation as the autochthon 
inhabitants of the Anatolia –thus downplaying competing claims brought forward by 
Greeks and Armenians.  
   Kadim Etilerimiz, atalarımız, bugünkü yurdumuzun ilk ve otokton 
sakini ve sahibi olmuşlardır. Burasını binlerce yıl evel anayurdun yerine 
özyurt yapmışlardır. Türklüğün merkezini Altaylardan Anadolu-
Trakya’ya getirmişlerdir. Türkiye Cümhuriyetinin sarsılmaz temelleri bu 
özyurdun çökmez kayalarıdır.130  
                                                 
128
 “The old image of Anatolia was that of a country of overflowing waters with 
Sakarya, Kızıl and Yeşil rivers running through tattered cities without roads, houses 
with plasters falling off and cemeteries with ruined gravestones. This land of high 
plateaus and angry rivers, every city, every village of which was poisoned by a swamp, 
has been unthought-of and unseen for years and has remained far and deprived from the 
true love of Turkishness. 
For centuries, under the influence of a perverse love which bound us to only the 
affection of Istanbul, we were prisoners of a sense that granted this dear land to the pure 
and beautiful Anatolian villagers who worked in mills, fields and battle-fronts under the 
sun and the snow.  
The one and only star of Anatolia, which does not have a breath of foreignness in its 
sun, its soil and its wind, Ankara, is the biggest monument of the Turkish Republic and 
the Turkish existence. It is the work of a being, who corrected the faith of the eyes that 
used to see Anatolia without love and of the hearts that used to sense it wrong; it is the 
work of the great Ghazi (Atatürk).” BTTK, p. 624. 
129
 Anthony D. Smith, “The Resurgence of Nationalism?: Myth and Memory in the 
Renewal of Nations”, p. 269. 
130
 “Our ancient Hittites, our ancestors, were the first and autochthon dwellers and 
owners of our present homeland. They made here their own-land in place of the 
motherland thousands of years ago. They brought the center of Turkishness from Altays 
  
 
44 
 
Since the Turkish nation has two homelands, the migration routes grow in 
importance. Etienne Copeaux talks about a map of the migrations -which supposedly 
took place in the Neolithic Age- that was the first map in all the Turkish history 
textbooks until the end of the 40s. According to him this map both summarizes and 
signifies the official history thesis of 1931: a map of Eurasia, with Europe in the 
periphery and arrows signifying migration routes originating from the “homeland” and 
covering the whole globe.131 
Parallel to this type of myth are what Schöpflin terms the myths of territory. He 
reminds that often the land sacralized as the “homeland” was a land of plenty and 
harmony in which the purity of the nation was safeguarded against outside contacts –
usually through natural, geographical barriers.132 To give but one example of each: 
   Ortaasiya yaylası insanlara ve insanlığa beşik olmaya başladığı eski 
zamanlarda bütün dünyanın en yüksek, en feyizli ve en gür hayat verici 
şartlarını kazanmış eşsiz bir alemdi.133  
   Dünyanın her tarafına yayılan bu dolikosefal insanlar yalnız topografya 
hususiyeti cihetile Ortaasiya yaylasına girememişlerdir.134  
 
The third kind of myth is that of ancestry –which we discussed above in some 
detail. To recapitulate: it constitutes solidarity and fraternity among the members of the 
nation by way of reference to a common ancestor –who can be either a historical or a 
fictive figure, or retain elements of both truth and fiction. This myth constructs the 
nation on the analogy of an extended family. If it is a kind of familial bond that holds 
the nation together, then greater sacrifices can be demanded of the individual for the 
good of the nation/family.  
The forth one is a myth of golden age. The Golden Age of Periclean Athens had, 
by the turn of the 19th century, been established as “the standard and model for 
                                                                                                                                               
to Anatolia-Thrace. The un-collapsible rocks of this land are the unshakable foundations 
of the Turkish Republic.” Afet İnan, “Tarihten Evel ve Tarih Fecrinde”, BTTK, p. 41. 
131
 Copeaux, Türk Tarih Tezinden Türk İslam Sentezine, p. 40. 
132
 Geoffrey Schöpflin, “The Functions of Myths and A Taxonomy of Myths”, p. 29.  
133
 “Central Asian plateau was a unique world, which possessed the highest, most fertile 
and most abundant life giving conditions of the whole world at the ancient times when it 
began to cradle human beings and humanity.” Afet İnan, “Tarihten Evel ve Tarih 
Fecrinde”, BTTK, p. 22. 
134
 “These dolichocephalous men, who spread throughout the world, could not enter only 
the Central Asian plateau due to its topographical characteristics.” Afet İnan, “Tarihten 
Evel ve Tarih Fecrinde”, BTTK, p. 24. 
  
 
45 
subsequent ideals of the Golden Age”.135 Yet, with Romanticism, a more inclusive 
concept of antiquity, which included the whole ancient world, emerged. This move was 
paralleled by ever-growing interest in archaeology and by the archaeological 
discoveries in Assyria, Sumeria, Achaemenid Iran and Hittite Anatolia throughout the 
19th century. The myths of golden age undertake important functions in the construction 
and/or reproduction of the national identity. They establish the authenticity of the nation 
by unearthing the “true self” of the nation at its best. That is crucial from a historicist, 
evolutionary worldview, which sees the every nation as going through a life cycle of 
birth, efflorescence, decline and rebirth.136 In this schema, the existence of the golden 
age makes the rebirth at the hands of the nationalists possible. They boost the self-
esteem of the members of the nation by reminding them of the past glories of their 
nation. They also provide “a standard of comparison” with the other nations.137 We can 
see examples of all these functions in the First Turkish History Congress. The level of 
civilization achieved by the Turks in their golden age in Central Asia around 7000-8000 
B.C. is compared to the situation of the Europeans of the same period in order to claim 
cultural superiority.  
The current political situation of the nation often translates into the choice of the 
elements that make a golden age, thus the past is seen through the lens of the present 
and more often than not with the aim of legitimating that present. For instance, as 
popular sovereignty becomes a fact in the political arena and the electorate expands to 
include the majority of the population, the choice of golden age and/or its interpretation 
will often shift from a dynastic to a more communal golden age.138 So it is only natural 
that the new Turkish state, trying to distance itself from both its imperial and religious 
heritage, should try to locate its golden age in a far away land and far away time, when 
the virtues of loyalty to the community and strict observance of the law supposedly 
reigned superior. 
The last two kinds of myths are interrelated: that of decline and that of 
regeneration. The narrative of the nation is not unilinear, but rather underlines the 
possibility of retrogression139; otherwise there would be no need for a nationalist revival 
and regeneration. The nationalists feel the need to advance the nation to save it from an 
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inferior cultural position not only in comparison to the technologically and 
educationally superior West, but also to “the underlying genius of the community”.140 
The members of such a nation are unaware of their true historical identity, without 
which they can find no meaning in life –they are strangers to themselves; thus, the 
primary task of the nationalists is to help people get in touch with that identity. This is 
also one of the factors motivating the participants of the First Turkish History Congress: 
to remind the nation of its true worth. 
There is a further kind of myth, a myth of election; but in Smith’s taxonomy, it 
has a primarily religious content. Schöpflin mentions the same myth but rephrases it 
more secular terms. He grants that a religious motif underlies this myth, but argues that 
in the modern world, this has transformed into something more secular -for instance, 
capacity for modernity or democracy; or stronger European credentials.141 The papers of 
the Congress contribute to the development of this myth in various ways: for instance, 
by way of establishing the primacy of the Turkish race in developing all human 
civilization –which is the main proposition of the Turkish history thesis; or by reference 
to the supposedly natural inclination of the Turks to rational thinking.142 This myth 
becomes the basis of claims to moral and cultural superiority.   
One final myth that Schöpflin mentions is that of foundation. This does not refer 
to an original moment but to a later foundation, something like a second coming. It 
usually revolves around the myth of the new state itself and comprises a claim that 
“afterwards everything will be different (better) and the newly founded system has 
dispensed with whatever made the old reprehensible”.143 The counterpart of this myth in 
the Turkish case is the myth of the new Republic –voiced by Esat Bey in the example 
below:  
   Her devirde bir suretle harikalar yaratan Türk milleti, işbu yakın 
zamanlar devrinde de Cumhuriyet idaresini kurarak idari, siyasi, içtimai 
ve medeni sahalarda dünyanın en büyük inkılaplarını yapmıştır.144 
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Smith examines the role of the myths of ethnic descent in Turkey and claims that 
they were particularly important in constructing the Turkish national identity “since 
until the end of the 19th century the very word Turk had pejorative connotations”.145 
This was the case even in the Ottoman Empire. According to Georgeon, “Türk” meant 
uncultivated, peasant in İstanbul idiom.146 The following comment from the Congress is 
also of interest:  
   Hatırlarsınız ki pek uzak olmayan zamanlara kadar pek muktedir 
addettiğimiz tarihçilerimiz bile, mesela Naima, Türk 
hakkında…tahkiramiz cümleler kullanmaktan çekinmezlerdi…öyle 
muharrirler gördük ki Türklerden bahsedilirken irkinmek ve iğrenmek 
alametleri göstermeyi marifet addederlerdi.147   
 
During the 19th century, “Western scholars and Orientalists began to take an 
interest in Ottoman studies”.148 There was a quick proliferation of works on the origins 
and the history of the Ottomans. All these works praised the Turkic-speaking peoples 
and located their origins in the Central Asia. Many grouped the Turkish language along 
with the Finno-Ugric languages –Hungarian, Finnish, Mongol and Estonian. The 
Ottoman writers themselves had been tracing their lineage back “to the tribe of Kayi 
Khan, a branch of the Oguz Turks, who had been forced by the Mongols to migrate 
westwards to the domains of the Seljuk Turks, at the time of the Ertugrul”.149 By the 
turn of the century, these new developments in the European knowledge about the 
Turks have merged with the traditional narrative of the Turkish history, producing a 
new awareness in the Ottoman intellectuals that the Turkish history was their own 
national history. Here, it is appropriate to draw attention to the fact that both these 
traditions –that of the Ottoman historians and that of the Orientalist- have proved 
effective on the formation of the official history thesis of the early Republic by setting 
its limits. In Turkey, like in all other historical settings, the energies of the nationalist 
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historians were devoted to saving the people from self-contempt and restoring their 
dignity and self-esteem through history education.150  
 
 
4. The Intellectuals and the Nationalist Culture 
 
 
 One of the definitions Smith provides for nationalism is as follows: “At the 
broadest level nationalism must be seen as a form of historicist culture and civic 
education, one that overlays or replaces the older modes of religious culture and familial 
education”.151 In this equation, historicism replaces religion; and familial education is to 
a large extent complemented –if not totally replaced- by civic education: at this juncture 
lie the seeds of the new nation. The participants of the First Turkish History Congress 
were aware of the necessity of such transformations for the establishment of a well-
grounded national identity. The papers were on the whole nonreligious –if not outright 
anti-religious- and there was a constant effort to endow the history of the nation with 
religious qualities; and the very reason for the convening of the Congress was to devise 
such a system of civic education. Smith argues that for the Romantics, “the sacred had 
been transferred from humanity’s primordial relationship with God to its rediscovered 
bond with Nature, with history and with the nation”.152 The historical nation is divine; 
this is an important component of the heritage that the nationalists inherit from the 
Romantics.  
 If nationalism is basically a historicist culture, then those who benefit most from 
nationalism are those who can claim authority in view of historicism, i.e. the 
intellectuals. The intellectual as the authoritative interpreter of the nation’s history, 
constructs the much-needed image of a distinguished past and in so doing enhances not 
only the position of his nation among all other nations but also his own standing within 
that nation. Being no longer a marginal character disconnected from his society, he 
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becomes a “national pedagogue” and takes active part in the formation of the nation.153 
The active role of the nationalist intellectuals is threefold: rediscovery, reinterpretation 
and regeneration. The first is the most basic one: it includes all sorts of research aimed 
at the formation of the history of the nation –“the role par excellence of the nationalist 
historian, philologist, anthropologist and archaeologist”.154 The second one is a bit more 
complicated and involves selecting from myths, memories and sources, in order to 
locate the nation in a historically significant context and to “make the national 
inspirations of the present appear authentic, natural and comprehensible”.155 In the third 
stage, the nationalist intellectual translates the cultural work of the first two stages into 
political conclusions, thus becoming one of the leaders of the movement. This was what 
the participants of the Congress were trying to accomplish. If it is the responsibility of 
the intellectuals to create the necessary historicist culture; it is the responsibility of the 
intelligentsia to diffuse that culture throughout the educated public -the consumer of 
that culture.156 To put it differently: the intellectuals create, the intelligentsia transmits 
and the educated public consumes nationalism.  
 Nationalism can also be seen on the behalf of the intellectuals as way of 
resolving their identity crises, brought along by “the challenges posed to traditional 
religion and society by the ‘scientific state’ and Western ‘revolutions’ that it promotes 
wherever its influence is felt”.157 This crisis is related to what Smith terms the crisis of 
“dual legitimation”; that is the dichotomy between legitimation in terms of tradition and 
religion and in terms of reason and observation, in the context of a modern state which 
makes increasing use of scientific thought. This crisis is naturally felt, first and 
foremost, by the intellectuals by virtue of their early exposure to such a system of 
thought. Eager to resolve this crisis, they turn elsewhere, trying to create new myths.158 
Historicism is probably the most important one of them. It is appealing in that it can 
provide a comprehensive world-view without resorting to metaphysics –hence the 
transformation from religion to historicism. 
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This crisis of dual legitimation was evident in the papers and discussions of the 
Congress. The emphasis on the concept of Truth (Hakikat) was of enormous importance 
in this framework. It seems that the new system of faith was based on the replacement 
of God (Hakk) by Truth (Hakikat). The resemblance between the Turkish words is 
striking. Hakikat means both truth and knowledge of God; and one of the primary 
qualities of God was being simultaneously the subject and the source of all truth. With a 
small tactical move, Turkish nationalism seems to have turned an existing belief system 
inside out, making it usable for its own legitimation. Thus, it makes sense that Hakikat 
was one of the most frequently used concepts throughout the Congress, probably second 
only to “nation”. 
On this plane, membership to the nation becomes a prerequisite of reaching the 
truth. Simultaneously, the knowledge and acceptance of (a particular) truth becomes the 
prerequisite of the membership to the nation:  
   Hakikat sizce ve bizce sabittir. Her asil manada cevheri tükenmez 
Türklük kanı taşıyanlar bundan şüphe edemezler. Davamız bizim 
hakikatimizi bütün beşeriyetin itikatları arasına koymaktır.159  
 
There are frequent references to the scientific method throughout the Congress 
papers and discussions.160 Yet it signifies more than a method. It seems that the 
scientific thought was regarded as not only an instrument in advancing the nation but 
also as an end in itself, crucial for the construction of the new national identity. 
Scientific thought was regarded as the emblem of modernity and a quality fitting the 
Turkish nation which supposedly founded the civilization as such.  
The Congress tries hard to create a deep belief in the immutability of the 
scientific thought. It is as if it is enough to say that the scientific method has been used 
to legitimate the propositions of the papers; if an idea is to be criticized the scientific 
method provides the basis. To establish science and reason as the primary instruments 
of “truth-telling” was an integral part of the transformation of the nation envisioned by 
the nationalist intelligentsia and the ruling elite. In this way, alternative criteria of 
“truth-making” –such as religion and religious ethics- would lose their ground. 
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Moreover, the political man necessitated by the new nation-state and the economic man 
necessitated by the capitalist system, into which the nation state had been integrating 
had a common quality; they were both imagined as “men of reason”. 
  If nationalism is primarily a cultural doctrine, then this cultural doctrine 
necessitates “the introduction of new concepts, languages and symbols”.161 These 
concepts include autonomy, identity, national genius, authenticity and unity and they 
“form an interrelated language or discourse”162 of nationalism. All these concepts are 
derived from the Romantic tradition.163 The most important of those concepts is 
probably that of identity. It emanated from the concept of “national genius” and found 
its full-fledged expression in the writings of Rousseau who argued that: “the first rule 
which we have to follow is that of national character: every people has, or must have, a 
character; if it lacks one, we must start by endowing it with one”.164 This concept was 
also central to Herder’s theory, according to which every nation had a “peculiar genius”. 
The nationalists had to rediscover the “authentic identity” of the nation –which 
embodied the “national genius”- through philology, history, archaeology and 
anthropology. The mythical quality of the concept of “national genius” is quite self-
evident: it refers to an ideal state, a pure national essence, which once existed –most 
probably, during the golden age of the nation- and was now lost. The uncovering of the 
Turkish “national genius” was one of the main tasks of the Congress. 
 Another important concept is that of autonomy. In the Kantian universe of “self 
determination”, autonomy had become “an ethical imperative for the individual, a 
principle of his being”.165 One could only be true to oneself if one was autonomous. At 
the hands of Schlegel, Fichte and other German Romantics, this principle was turned 
into “a philosophy of national self-determination”:166 only through achieving autonomy 
could the community return to its pure, uncontaminated state –recover its authentic 
identity. Again the mythical implications are clear: through autonomy, a community can 
re-attain the glory of its Golden Age. In a similar fashion, yet another important 
concept, that of unity, can be connected to myth-making in the following way: fraternity 
which is the social expression of unity, can be established by way of constructing the 
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nation on the analogy of an extended family, which is held together by the belief in a 
common ancestor, a myth of ethnic origins. The concept of unity further implies a 
homogenizing of the people to form a unitary nation –which can be accomplished only 
through a standardized and centralized education system, which can be undertaken only 
by the state: thus it is the state that produces the illusion -and upholds the myth- of the 
unity of the nation.         
 If nationalism is “an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining 
autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members 
to constitute an actual or potential nation”167; the First Turkish History Congress was a 
near perfect tool of nationalism for through the version of history and/or myths that it 
promoted, it aimed at the construction and the reproduction (through the use of the 
textbooks perfected in that congress) of those exact three qualities of the nation.  
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3 
 
LIMITS OF MYTH-MAKING AND NATIONAL IDENTITY 
 
 
 
 Smith claims that “nationalism takes its color from its context”.168 What he 
provides in his theory is a general framework which more or less fits any particular 
nationalism. Yet each nationalist movement reworks the general blueprint of 
nationalism in its own way by adding it “more contextual and particularistic notions” –
even if, on the long run, they turn out to be only rhetorical (like the Sun Language 
Theory).169 Nonetheless, this should not lead us into thinking that these specific 
concepts are secondary to the success of specific nationalisms; rather they “play a vital 
role in each instance and not just a supporting role”.170 
 The specific and contextual concepts utilized by the nationalist movements are 
often the results of certain limitations. As Smith repeatedly underlines neither the 
formation of the nationalist identity nor the associated processes of myth-making are 
limitless endeavors. The real and/or imagined limits of the nation are what really endow 
it with its uniqueness. Here, it is also useful to remember Gellner’s claim that the 
differentiating marks that are required in the invention of a nation might sometimes be 
“purely negative”.171 A nation is, more often than not, defined by what it is not, rather 
than what it is. This aspect of nationalism is naturally more pronounced in the case of 
the Turkish nationalism as a result of its reactionary character; the Turkish nationalism 
was formed in reaction to the Western imperial nations, to Russia and pan-Slavism, to 
the nationalisms of its minority populations –including the Arabs-, to its semi-peripheral 
position within world-economy, to Islam, etc.    
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1. Former Power Structures 
  
 
The first limitation on the construction of national identity was provided “by the 
nature and activities of the preceding political system and institutions”.172 Each new 
regime defines itself in opposition to the ancien régime that it has replaced; thus the 
formation of the new national identity depends on the repudiation of all the former 
identities. For that reason, the nationalists engage in one of their main battles within the 
nation “against the older self-definitions”.173  
It is important to add that in the case of Turkey the repudiation of the former 
regime included a reaction to Islam as well; since Islam has formed one of the main 
bases of the political system. In this regard, it was the nationalist historians’ job to 
locate the essence, the true identity of the nation in a golden age which had no 
connection whatsoever either to the Ottoman Empire or to the Islamic civilization; thus 
symbolically connecting that golden age with the reawakening of the nation under the 
guidance of the new nationalist ruling elite, in order to legitimate the new regime and to 
establish its credentials at a level much deeper than those of the Ottoman Empire or the 
Islam, the two major loci of power and legitimation that the new regime had to compete 
with. A golden age located in the depths of history and under the sand hills of Central 
Asia was more than convenient.  
The Ottoman period was imagined not as a time of a great and successful 
empire, but as a time of the demise of the nationalist sentiments and loss of identity on 
the behalf of the members of the nation. The comments of Halil Nimetullah Bey on the 
issue provide a summary of this position:  
   İnsanların mevcudiyeti iki türlü varlıktan tevekkün eder: ferdi varlık ve 
içtimai varlık. Ferdi varlığın uzvi, ruhi kısmından başka bütün 
unsurlarının içtimai olduğu bugün ilmin vardığı en son hakikatlerden 
biridir…Milli şuuru sönmüş fertler kendi varlıklarından bihaber şuursuz 
idraksız bir halde yaşarlar. İşte bizim bundan evel içinde bulunduğumuz 
Osmanlılık böyle bir yokluk alemi idi…Türk inkılabı bu Osmanlılık 
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karanlığını yırtarak yepyeni bir nur alemi olan Türklük dünyasını 
yaratmıştır.174 
 
In this context, one of the participants of the Congress quoted Atatürk’s words 
from a speech he delivered in 1923, in İzmir Economy Congress:  
   Milli bir devir yaşamıyorduk. Milli tarihe malik bulunmuyorduk. 
Osmanlı tarihi padişahların, hakanların, zümrelerin destanı 
mahiyetindeydi.175  
 
When viewed from the framework of the national history thesis, The Ottoman 
history was nothing more than the history of a family; and thus, it was deemed 
historically insignificant. What was required was not to search for the roots of the 
Turkish nation in the successes and failures of a family; but rather to seek an original 
and authentic Turkishness in the depths of history.  
   Kafasını ve vicdanını en son terakki şuleleriyle güneşlendirmeye karar 
vermiş olan bugünün Türk çocukları biliyor ve bildireceklerdir ki onlar 
400 çadırlı bir aşiretin değil, onbinlerce yıllık ari medeni yüksek bir 
ırktan gelen yüksek kabiliyetli bir millettir.176 
 
With this assertion Afet İnan has successfully completed the task assigned to the 
Turkish historians by Atatürk in 1928. 
Moreover, the character of the new nation had to be imagined in opposition to 
the Ottoman past in order to legitimate the claim that the Ottoman period was a time 
unbefitting the nature of the Turks; thus providing greater legitimation for the new 
regime. Mediha Muzaffer Hanım, in her closing speech, delineated the differences 
between the Ottoman period and the new regime in the following words: 
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   Türk milleti, Türk Cümhuriyeti artık yabancıların zevkinden, 
sanatından, ilinden, seciyesinden renk ve kalıp almayan, her şeyde milli 
harsını, milli kültürünü, milli seciyesini gösteren bir teşekkül, medeniyet 
dünyasının varlığını tamamlayan yepyeni bir alemdir. Bu alemde 
taklitten, taassuptan daima kaçan ve hakikatten nur alan bir kuvvet var… 
   Hakikati hakiki hayattan alan, en samimi en vitaraf bir ilim mantığı ile 
tahlil eden, düşündüğü ve olduğu gibi söyleyen, dinde taassuba, ahlakta 
riyakarlığa, lisanda yabancılığa, sanatta taklide rağbet etmeyen mert bir 
Türk seciyesi var.177 
 
The official history thesis –in a way supporting and legitimating the secularism 
of the new regime- argued that the main reason for the decline of the Empire was that 
the ulema class had been standing in the way of scientific developments; unfortunately, 
the Sultan who had combined both a secular and a spiritual duty in his person was not in 
a position to defend science against religion.178 Only through the absolute separation of 
religious and state affairs and the expulsion of religion from all the facets of the public 
realm -and its strict limitation to the public domain- could a modern nation state be 
formed and modernization undertaken.179 
The national history thesis did not regard the Koran to be the word of God. 
Within the framework of general history, the development of Christianity was recounted 
as a social, cultural and philosophical formation. It was then argued that Islam was a 
rationalized version of Christianity.180 This argument was a further blow to the 
legitimacy of Islam.  
One of the main propositions of the Turkish history thesis was that it was the 
Turks who “founded and developed the Islamic civilization which had been the highest 
civilization of the world from the 8th to the 13th centuries and has provided the 
foundation of the present Western civilization”.181 According to this line of argument, 
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an Islamic society needed to receive “fresh blood” from outside in order to overcome its 
inherent conservatism and accomplish advancement in civilizational terms; this “fresh 
blood” has been supplied by the Turks for centuries.182  
Within this framework, one of the participants questions the reasons motivating 
Turks to convert to Islam. The answer is focused on pragmatic, rather than spiritual 
reasons. The Turks had converted to Islam because there was a higher level of well-
being in the Islamic world; because they were geographically closer to the Islamic 
world; and because Islam provided a greater amount of sovereignty to the rulers in 
comparison to the other religions.183 Claiming that the Turks had converted to Islam for 
pragmatic reasons implied that religious beliefs could be easily changed if and when 
they did not conform to the needs of the state and the requirements of the time.  
  
 
2. Scholarly Criteria and the Problem of Resonance 
 
 
The second limitation was effected by the criteria of verifiability: the national 
history and the accompanying myths on which the national identity depends should be 
verifiable: the better documented they are, the better they can stand the pressure of the 
emotions attached to them and counter efforts at demythologization.184 Fabricated 
histories may prove successful for some time in boosting the self-esteem of the nation, 
but sooner or later, when they are exposed, they will cause much damage to the sense of 
continuity vital for the maintenance of the national identity and “induce cynicism and 
apathy for the national cause”.185 A similar argument may be developed about the 
official Turkish history thesis and the Sun Language Theory of the early Republic. They 
did help replenish the self-confidence of the nation for some time but when the 
revolutionary fervor settled down, apathy slowly took over its place. Then again, it 
would be wrong to claim outright that such nationalist fabrications do not have long 
term effects; no matter how discredited they may become in the end, they nonetheless 
leave some traces on the collective identity of the nation –especially if they have been 
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transmitted through the education system and consumed by people while they were still 
quite young –like the official history thesis. Moreover, even if there have been 
modifications in this thesis and it has to a large extent been academically renounced; not 
only it did continue to capture the imagination of the nationalists, but also managed to 
retain its place in the history textbooks. For instance, the proposition that all 
brachycephalous people originating from Central Asia were Turks and that they 
civilized the entire human race, remains a part of the official history textbooks in 
Turkey even today.186 This shows that, however discredited it may have become, some 
of the main tenets of the official thesis have been thoroughly internalized and have 
become part of the common fund of knowledge, as well as that of common sense.      
 Another limit is set by the popular side of the myth-making process. In order to 
produce the results they are aimed at, myths and national histories should find 
resonance among the larger public; they should, so as to say, hit some chord. If the 
nation at large is not receptive to a certain version of national history or myth, even 
documentation and verification cannot go a long way. In this respect, Smith talks about 
what he terms “the patterning of a particular ethno-history” by which he basically refers 
to “the relationship over time between certain key components that recur in that 
community’s history”.187 What we have here is the actual or imagined repetition of 
certain key concepts throughout the history of the nation; to find resonance, official 
national history and myths should fit into this overall pattern. 
 
 
3. Geo-Politics 
 
 
 Another set of limits was imposed by the material geo-political conditions within 
which the new nation found itself. Since international borders could not be made to fit 
into the national identity, the national identity had to conform with those borders 
instead. Even when there was an attempt at redrawing borders, the claims to land were 
mainly the result of politics rather than of myths; the later were modified in order to 
support the former. For instance, it was crucial for the Turkish nationalists to “prove” 
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that they were the original inhabitants of Anatolia to legitimize their claim over that 
land and to discredit the counter claims of Greeks and Armenians. To this end, it was 
necessary to argue that Turks were there before all the others; it was even better to 
claim that Anatolia had been completely Turkified and was inhabited by a monolithic 
population of Turks, i.e. that there were, and had been, no “others” who could produce 
such counter claims. To claim that the Hittites were Turks was such a strategy: not only 
did it establish the antiquity of the Turkish population in Anatolia, but it also provided 
an alternative to the European idea of the “Greek miracle”188: thus competing with the 
Greeks in two levels simultaneously. The antiquity of the Turks in Anatolia was 
established by way of turning the Turkish nation into the Turkish race, a process which 
will be dealt with in more detail above. The following quotation provides an example of 
how the counter-claims to the idea of the “Greek miracle” were formulated: 
   Yunan ananelerinin bize Fenikeliler adila tanıttığı kavim ne cenubî 
Avrupaya yazıyı getirdikleri ne de Yunanistanın Attik kıtasında, adalarda 
ve İtalya yarımadasında şehirler tesis ettikleri zaman tek bir unsur 
halinde bulunuyorlardı. Başlarında bilhassa Türkler mevcuttu.189      
 
Turkish nationalists developed a problematic relationship to one other ex-
minority of the empire, the Arabs. The Arab territories of the former empire had been 
lost and there was no considerable amount of Arab minority in the new Republic. Yet 
the Arabs kept providing one of the counter-images of the new Republic. On one level, 
the Turkish nationalists kept obsessing about the “Arab betrayal”, that is about how the 
fellow Muslims could rebel and fight against the Ottoman Empire/the Caliphate. On 
another, they were taking part in an Orientalising discourse: regarding the Arabs as 
exotic others, helped to differentiate themselves from the rest of the Islamic civilization 
and symbolically located them at a position in proximity to the West in proportion to its 
distance from the East. It was also a strategy which helped them define the Turkish 
nation as distinct from its Islamic heritage; there was an authentic Turkish identity 
unaffected and untainted by its coexistence with Islam, and Islam was only one of the 
many traditions which influenced the Turks in their long history. The difference of the 
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Turkish nation from Arabs was proof that an overriding Islamic identity did not exist, or 
that if it did, it did not affect the Turks. The sharper the contrast between the Turks and 
the Arabs, stronger was that proof.        
 
 
4. Western Influence 
 
 
 The final –and probably the most decisive- set of limits was produced by the 
influence of the West on the new national states. This influence was, in most cases, 
complicated and multi-layered and worked mainly in two ways. First, it was the 
Western nations that set the standards for the formation of nations by virtue of 
precedence: they were the first nations to be formed and being successful -in terms of 
politics, economics and culture alike- they had become models to be emulated. As we 
mentioned earlier, once formed, the nation became a reproducible model and by the end 
of the Great War the nation-state had become the norm in international politics. The 
new states found themselves under great pressure to rapidly form their nations on the 
line of their Western predecessors. Moreover, the nation was the only “tested 
framework for economic and social development”190 which meant that the new states 
had no other chance than to adopt it, for they could not risk failure in those realms –a 
modern state could not ever legitimate itself without material success in socio-economic 
terms.191 Historically, the first nations of the West were based on ethnic elements; for 
the latecomers this meant that they had to produce out of whatever cultural materials 
they might have, a coherent mythology and symbolism of an ethnic community of 
history.192 Their recognition by the international community as legitimate states 
depended on the success of that project of nation formation.  
As Anderson claims the new nations had the advantage of being able to copy 
and combine different styles of nationalism; they did not have to invent their tactics and 
strategies from scratch. Yet this had a down-side; there were somewhat strict limits to 
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what constituted a nation and how it was supposed to be formed. As Chatterjee 
complains, it was as if the imagination of the new nations –especially the post-colonial 
ones- had to “remain forever colonized”.193 The rules of being a nationalist had Western 
origins, which was bound to create a dilemma for the non-Western nationalists who 
were aiming at the recovery/recreation of an authentic identity for their nations. This 
dilemma translated into a kind of love-hate relationship between the non-Western 
nationalists and their Western ideological predecessors. Kedourie argues that in the non-
Western nationalisms, imitation was combined with psychological resentment.194 On the 
one hand, the nationalists admired their more successful Western counterparts; on the 
other they despised their pretensions to cultural superiority.  
There was always the tension of trying to create a nation which would qualify 
the standards of the Western nations, while still being clearly distinct from them; a 
constant tension between the simultaneous attempts of identification and differentiation. 
Thus the non-Western nationalists constantly emphasized their difference from –and 
even ultimate superiority to- the Western nations; while at the same time looking to 
those same Western nations for approval and recognition. This tension can clearly be 
seen in Chatterjee’s comments on the Indian nationalism: “language…became a zone 
over which the nation first had to declare sovereignty and then had to transform in order 
to make it adequate for the modern world”; or “the desire to construct an aesthetic form 
that was modern and national and yet recognizably different from the Western”195.  
The same tension was recognizable in the First Turkish History Congress and 
the official history thesis it purported. One of the main aims of the Turkish nationalist 
historians was to shatter the Western prejudices about the Turks. They were intent on 
replacing the Western image of the Turks as the nomadic warriors of the yellow race 
with the image of the Turks as the source of all human civilization. It was crucial for the 
self-esteem of the new nation to prove the equality –and if possible, the superiority- of 
the Turks in comparison to the Europeans and to accomplish this with their methods and 
with reference to their authorities and sources. The self-image of the nation was 
invariably bound with its image held to be true by the Europeans.  
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 The Turkish national identity was constituted, so to speak, from the outside in; 
the nation imagined itself as being imagined –or seen itself as being seen- by the West. 
It was always the West that had the gaze/power in this configuration; and Turkish 
identity was invariably bound to be reactive and defensive. It was this, more than 
anything else, which contributed to the making of the Turkish national identity. The 
Turkish nation was always more concerned with how it looked from outside than how it 
really was. 
 The intellectual sphere was one of the main battlegrounds in this respect, with 
Turkish theorists persistently trying to outdo the theoretically more solid theories of 
their European counterparts. The above mentioned differentiation-identification 
dichotomy was also in operation here; in trying so hard to differentiate themselves from 
the Orientalists, the Turkish nationalist intelligentsia, more often than not, found itself 
in the position of an auto-Orientalist. Likewise, in formulating Turkish national 
historiography as the diametrical opposite of the Eurocentric historiography which they 
were devoted to undermine, they produced a national history that was “both the anti-
thesis and the mirror-image of Eurocentricism”.196 The “national history” tried to 
understand and classify everything in reference to itself -just like Eurocentric history 
has done; and has become Turcocentric, so to speak.  
 By the turn of the 20th century, the overriding beliefs among the Orientalists 
about the Ottoman Empire consisted of mainly two elements. First, Turks were strictly 
nomadic until they came under the influence of the Islamic civilization in eleventh 
century. Following from this point, all the Turkic-Islamic states in history owed their 
civilizational accomplishments solely to the influence of the Islamic and Persian 
traditions.197 If that was true, the Ottoman history or the history of any other Turkish 
state –including the new Republic- was only a chapter in Islamic history. Accordingly, 
any system of law the Ottomans had –if they had one at all- was congruent with the 
Islamic law; at least until they conquered Constantinople and began a new phase of 
Byzantine influence.198 This brings us to the second proposition of the Orientalists, the 
idea of Byzance après Byzance, developed originally by Iorga.199 This line of thought 
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suggested that the Turks in Anatolia -being so primitive, so completely tribal and so 
lacking in any tradition of state and law of any kind- could not have developed an 
empire; all they were good for was fighting. Thus the existence and the success of the 
Ottoman Empire were predicated on the Christians that they enlisted and the imitation –
even replication- of the Byzantine institutions. Accordingly, the institutional framework 
of the empire was fully developed only after the conquest of Constantinople.200 
 These were not strictly academic arguments but had real effects on politics. The 
political corollary of the Byzance après Byzance idea was that the Ottoman Empire was 
a historical accident, rather than the rightful owner and the legitimate ruler of the 
territory it encompassed. Hence, “the Turks had no right to continue to rule the lands 
that they had usurped from Byzantium, from the medieval Bulgarian state, or from that 
of the Serbian prince Stefan Dushan”.201 
 The Allied memorandum addressed to the Turkish delegation at the Sévres 
Peace Talks on 23 June 1919, probably provides the best example of how the prejudiced 
Orientalist ideas created in academic and intellectual circles could be translated into 
political terms: 
   Whether in Europe, Asia or Africa, there was no single case in which 
the institution of the Turkish administration was not followed by a 
decline in material wealth and level of culture of the country; likewise, an 
increase in material wealth and level of culture always followed the 
termination of Turkish rule. Among European Christians as well as the 
Moslem peoples of Syria, the Arab land and Africa, the Turk has done 
nothing but to ravage and destroy what he has conquered; it is not in the 
Turkish nature to develop in peace what he has acquired through war.202 
 
This general framework of the Orientalist ideas about the Ottoman Empire 
dictated to a large extent the limits of Turkish historiography –and in turn, the Turkish 
national identity. On the most basic level, there was the problem of being seen as the 
heir of the Ottoman Empire by the Europeans. While the Turkish nationalist historians 
were working hard to prove that the Ottoman period was just a chapter –and not so 
important one- in the history of the Turkish nation; Europe still treated the new 
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Republic as an inheritor of the Ottoman Empire and thus argued the legitimacy of the 
Ottoman rule to decide whether the Republic had title to the land that it ruled. 
Moreover, Europeans were persistently regarding the Turks as under the influence of 
Islamic civilization. Hence, the nationalist historians of the new Republic found 
themselves in the awkward position of being regarded as the epitome of the very 
traditions from which they were trying to differentiate themselves. The secular identity 
–and its supporting history- they were trying to construct in opposition to their Islamic 
heritage; as well as the modern, republican identity –and its supporting history- they 
were trying to construct in opposition to the traditional, imperialist and dynastic heritage 
of the Ottoman Empire were magnified and brought into sharper focus due to these 
Western ideas. In a way, the reaction against the Orientalist perception of the Turkish 
nation coupled with and intensified the reaction against the ancien régime and Islam. 
For instance, the repudiation of the conquests and the expansion of the Ottoman Empire 
and their labeling as costly adventures which were not supported by the Turkish nation 
developed as a reaction to the image of the warrior/barbarian Turks held by the 
Europeans, rather than as a direct reaction to the former regime.203 In this equation, the 
Ottoman Empire –the state and not the people- were turned into scapegoats; if the 
Europeans envisioned the Turks as militaristic, the Ottoman administration was to 
blame, not the Turkish nation.  
As opposed to the idea that the Turks were completely nomadic and incapable of 
developing civilization before they converted to Islam, the nationalist historians 
developed the idea of the  original Turkic civilization flourishing in Central Asia around 
7000 BC and then civilizing the rest of the human race. In opposition to the idea that the 
Turkic-Islamic states owed their civilization to the influence of the Islamic tradition, 
they emphasized the role of the Turks in not only defending and spreading Islam but 
also revitalizing it.  
Against the idea of Byzance après Byzance, they claimed that the initial wave of 
migration to Anatolia had successfully Turkified the entire population and that the 
Turks held title to Anatolia not as inheritors of the Ottoman Empire, but as the 
autochthon population of the territory. That is, all the basic assumptions of the official 
history thesis were in one way or another related to the Western perception of the 
Turkish nation.       
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One might further argue that the West has played the role of the “constituting 
other” in the cases of non-Western nationalist movements, yet there were two ways that 
such a role could be played. For instance in Central Europe, as Neumann has showed, 
the national identity was to a large extent predicated on the “negative and distorting 
images of Russia” as the constituting other.204 A similar role has been played by the 
Greeks, the Armenians and the Arabs for the Turkish national identity. Yet this was a 
two way process and not all the constituting others were negative in character. For 
almost all of the non-Western nationalisms and definitely for Turkish nationalism, an 
even more important part of their national identities were predicated on the distorted, 
but this time positive, images of the West -and modernity and progress which were 
thought to be almost synonymous with it.     
 Western ideas about the Turks, limited the national history thesis in one further 
way: There was widespread belief that the Turks were members of the yellow race and 
within the discourse of racism, the yellow race was deemed secondary. As was 
mentioned above the necessity of proving that the Turks were not secondary to 
European nations was the spark that fueled the project of the writing of the nationalist 
history. Accordingly, the official history thesis had no chance but to acquire racist 
overtones. Throughout the Congress, it was repeatedly asserted that the Turks had no 
relations whatsoever with the yellow race. The comments of Şevket Aziz on the issue 
provide only one of numerous examples:  
   Asiya brakisefallerin ocağıdır. Bunlar Alp adamı tipidir ve Türk de bu 
tiptir. Bizim son telâkkiye gore esasen bir ırk olmaktan uzak bulunan 
Sarılarla bir alâkamız yoktur.205 
 
Resorting to the notion of “race” also provided a fertile strategy for the 
nationalist historians who were trying bypass many of the problems elaborated above. 
The antiquity of the Turks in Anatolia; as well as the existence of an authentic Turkish 
identity pre-dating Islam could be established by reference to pre-history. Yet, doing so 
would produce a further limitation, for pre-historic times eluded the historian due to 
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lack of documentation. Archaeology could prove helpful but its fund of knowledge was 
limited; not to mention the impossibility of discovering a past which in most cases did 
not exist. Under such conditions, the idea of race came in handy. Almost all the 
problems that the Turkish nationalist historians were trying to tackle could be handled 
with the help of anthropology and its related sciences and by reference to theories of 
race. Below, we will examine the importance of “race” in the official national history 
thesis in more detail.  
 
 
5. Race and Nationalist Imagination 
 
 
If ethnic communities were often confused with races, that was because the 
racist discourse with its supposedly “scientific” notions had dominated any attempt at 
the examination of “the purely cultural and historical differences of ethnies”-especially 
between 1850 and 1945.206  
The ideal of popular sovereignty had originally developed in the West; as it 
moved east, to the non-European nations, “it took on an increasingly populist form” -
especially within the framework of ethnic nationalism- and led to the exaltation of “the 
people as the repository of truth and virtue and the embodiment of true national 
values”.207 From there, it was but a small step to racism; yet that did not mean that this 
step had to be taken.  
 If and when nationalism joined forces with racism, it was because racism could 
satisfy the need for rootedness crucial for all nationalisms in a definitive manner with 
the help of “science”. In its claim to absolute truth, racism resembled a civic religion208 
–quite in line with nationalism itself. Yet one should not be led to believe that racism 
was a simple discriminatory policy tool that could be put to use by the nationalists 
whenever they needed. It was rather a well developed and focused world view on its 
own right.209  
                                                 
206Smith, National Identity, pp. 21-22. 
207Smith, “Ethnic Nationalism and the Plight of Minorities”, p. 196. 
208George Mosse, “Racism and Nationalism”, in Hutchinson and Smith (eds.), 
Nationalism: Critical Concepts in Political Science, vol. 4, p. 1383. 
209
 Ibid., p.1382. 
  
 
67 
Yet, as was hinted above, the Turkish case was a bit more complicated; 
nationalist history writing in a way necessitated a conscious manipulation of the idea of 
race and required the assumed interchangeability of the concepts of ethnicity and race.   
 
 
1. Turkish History Thesis and the Idea of Race 
 
The national history thesis propounded by the Congress was predicated on the 
formation of a close tie between the ideas of nationality and of race. Even though most 
of the participants found it necessary to affiliate the theories of race with imperialism 
and Eurocentricism –in a way devaluing their scientific credentials and emphasizing 
their political uses-210, the notion of race and theories of racism had considerable 
influence on the formation of the Turkish national history. In most of the papers Turk 
was used as the name of a race rather than a nation. 
Among the theories of race, Gobineau’s work –entitled Essai sur l’inégalité des 
races humaines (1853) was probably the most influential one. Many of the participants 
of the Congress gave Gobineau reference in matters of race and explained his ideas in 
detail; yet, they then emphasized that such a theory based on the superiority of the Arian 
race was no longer scientifically tenable. Although the nationalist historians found it 
necessary to distance themselves from a notion that they associated with European 
imperialism, this distance was only rhetorical.     
It seems that the project of the official history thesis was not only limited to the 
writing of the national history, but rather aimed at the re-writing of the world history in 
a Turcocentric way. This could only be achieved by fusing the notions of 
nationality/ethnicity and race together. It is possible to see in Afet İnan’s paper that the 
word “Turk” was explicitly being used to define a race: “ortaasiyadan bahsederken tek 
bir ırk düşünüyorum ve onun adına Türk diyorum.”211  
The original idea that was the hallmark of the national history thesis and the 
biggest contribution of the Turkish intelligentsia to the cumulative fund of knowledge 
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was expressed by İhsan Şerif Bey as follows: “Dünyaya şamil olan medeniyetin mebde 
ve menşei Ortaasiya yaylasıdır ve o medeniyetin naşir ve nakilleri de Türklerdir.”212 
Various participants, who tried to prove this point, freely and extensively quoted 
from European theorists. Of course, the works cited did not have any direct reference to 
Turks as such; but in their view that was only natural when one took into consideration 
the hostility and fear with which the European world viewed the Turks. The hostility 
and prejudice of the European scientists against the Turks was a recurrent theme 
throughout the Congress; the participants were convinced that their European 
counterparts were trying to down-grade the Turks out of spite and that this was 
understandable when one took into consideration the fear that the constant Turkish raids 
must have created in the collective European psyche throughout history. 
Some of the participants started out by proving that Central Asia was the cradle 
of civilization. There was already a literature on that issue in Europe.213 After all, the 
notion “Aryan” so popular among the Europeans was claimed to be Turkish in origin, 
deriving from the Turkish word “er” –which means man. The presumption was that 
those who founded the Western civilization –like all other civilizations worthy of 
praise- were the Turks. They had forgot about their origins once they had settled in 
Europe; but retained a memory of the land of the Arians, from where they came, at the 
depths of their collective memory. It was supposedly this memory that translated into 
the proliferation of theories about the Arians.214 Thus, the Turkish history thesis was not 
against the existence of the Arian race or its superiority per se; their only opposition –or 
correction- was that this race was actually Turkic in origin.  
Some of the participants who tried to use a more ‘scientific’ discourse, talked 
about the brachycephalous men rather than the Arians. Brachycephalous men had 
originated in Central Asia and then spread throughout the world, melting down the 
dolichocephalous races of the less-developed regions of the world in time and bringing 
civilization to the entire world.  
Certain other papers referred to the notion of the Alpine man. After the 
credentials of the Alpine men -as the brachycephalous men that spread civilization 
throughout Europe- were firmly established by reference to foreign scientists, it was 
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claimed that the Alpine men were Turks although their name was not explicitly cited by 
these scientists. To give but one example of this position: “muassır alimlerin Alp adamı 
dediği ve bizim daha doğru olarak Ata Türkler diye andığımız insanlar, yani kudret ve 
kabiliyet kaynağı harikalı soy”.215 To recapitulate, human beings might have originated 
at different places simultaneously, but the human civilization was developed by one 
race exclusively, the Turkish race.   
Taking these arguments in consideration, it is not possible to understand why 
there was a constant refusal of the ideas of Gobineau. Reşit Galip summarises the ideas 
of Gobineau in the following manner: the existence of completely different and distict 
races in the world; the inequality of races in terms of their natural talents; the lack of 
ability of the black and the yellow races to develop civilization; the suitability of the 
Arian race to the development civilization; the fact that the whole human civilization 
was a work of this race; the unfortunate fact that in many places, this beautiful race had 
intermixed with lower races and lost its purity (with the purest ones being the 
Germans); the assumption that races would develop in proportion to the amount of 
white blood circulating in the veins of its members. 
Actually, these assumptions also formed the basic tenets of the Turkish national 
history thesis. If we follow the order above: the autochthon population of the ancient 
Central Asia were Turks (brachycephalous, Alpine men or Arians); they were superior 
to other races inhabiting the rest of the world –as suggested by Reşit Galip in the 
following manner: “brakisefallerin bilhassa alplileri dolikosefallere nazaran biyolojik 
bir faikiyeti olduğu kabul edilmelidir”216-; the Turks were the source of all human 
civilization which was the main proposition of the official history thesis. Other races 
cannot develop their own civilizations; they can achieve civilizational capacity only 
under the rule of Turks or in time, through thorough intermixing with the Turks, which 
eventually leads to an improvement of their racial qualities. Certain hybrid races had 
developed as a result of Turks’ intermingling with inferior races.  
An important corollary of this line of argument was that the purest Turkish race 
could be found in Anatolia. Since Anatolia has been a constant route of passage for the 
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Turkic peoples moving westwards since the Ancient times, it is no more possible to 
trace any remnants of a race predating brachycephalous. Here, one can clearly see how 
equating race with nation helped the scientists of the early Republican period to 
circumvent the question of the antiquity of the Turks in Anatolia –and the associated 
question of the Republic’s title to land. Reşit Galip explains this point in a manner that 
makes its political implications clear:  
   Yapılan antropolojik tetkiklerde ancak %5.5 nispetinde dolikosefal 
unsure bulunmuştur. Bu Anadolu’da yaşayan ırkın hiçbir saha ile kıyas 
edilemeyecek derecede Atalar vasfını muhafaza etmekte olduğunu apaçık 
gösterir…elde mevcut antropolojik tetkikler Anadoluda dini ve siyasi 
sarikler ve dil ayrılığı dolayısıyla ayrı unsurlar halinde görülmüş olan 
Ermeniler, vs. gibi zümrelerin ve hatta mübadele edilen Rum ahalinin 
dahi aynı ırk tipi menşeinden geldiklerini göstermektedir.217 
 
Since we know from prior arguments that this race was the Turkish race, the 
scientific proposition provided here translated into and legitimated the political 
assertion that the Anatolian population was a homogenous Turkish community and 
included no minorities whatsoever. 
 
 
2. Object of National Beauty: The National Body 
  
Racism was built upon “anthropology, history and –last but not least- a 
reawakened aesthetic consciousness” which it collectively melded into “a standard of 
human looks, beauty and behavior”.218 It was no coincidence that anthropology –as well 
as certain other sciences concerned with the human body, such as physiognomy- 
originated at the same time as the formation of a new aesthetic ideal –that is, “the 
rediscovery of Greek sculpture popularized by J.J. Winckelmann”.219 This new 
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 “In the anthropological investigations performed, the dolichocephalous element was 
found to be only 5.5%. This clearly shows that the race inhabiting Anatolia has 
preserved the quality of Ancestors to an extent that is beyond comparison to any other 
place…Present anthropological investigations show that groups of people, who have 
been considered as separate elements due to religious and political factors and linguistic 
differences, such as the Armenians, and even the Greek population which has been 
exchanged with Greece, are descended from the origin of the same race type.” BTTK, p. 
134. 
218
 George Mosse, “Racism and Nationalism”, pp. 1382-3. 
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 Ibid., p. 1385. 
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aesthetics served the need of the emergent industrial societies for both dynamism and 
order: it was based on harmony and proportion and “upon ‘quiet greatness’, projecting 
moderation as a cardinal principle of beauty”.220 Yet, this moderation was always 
accompanied with –and balanced by- a touch of activism and virility.  
 Parallel to these developments was the establishment of the link between body 
and mind during the second half of the 18th century, which led to a heightened interest 
in scientific works devoted to the deciphering human appearance –whether in 
anthropology, phrenology or physiognomy.221  
 As the human body became both the basis and the ultimate symbol of the idea of 
race, there has been a proliferation of works concerned with the methods to “recognize 
on sight one’s own as against those of a different race”. Within racist literature, “the 
very construction of the human body, with its size, sinews, muscles and bones, were 
made to bear witness to the superiority or the inferiority of a race and its culture”.222  
The body structure not only expressed, but also naturalized and legitimized cultural 
difference.  
The influence of such a line of thought was discernible in the First Turkish 
History Congress. There seems to be an obsession with the “beauty of the Turks” to 
such an extent that it becomes self-evident that beauty should be signifying something 
bigger than itself; this points to a racially organized world view. The Turks are beautiful 
because they are racially superior, because they are virtuous, because they are civilized, 
so on and so forth. Şevket Aziz links the beauty of the Turkish race to its capacity for 
civilization in the following manner: 
   Bendeniz Anadoluda gezdiğim zaman ne kadar saf, güzel velût Türk 
ırkına tesadüf ettim…Maddî mânevî inkişaflara müsait, biyolojikman 
söylüyorum, mütekamil bir iskelete, ete ve kafaya, hamura malik bir 
beşer tipidir.223 
 
Yet it is hard to be sure whether the participants of the Congress were really 
racists or they were reacting against the racist prejudices of the Europeans which 
deemed Turks ugly –and hence, racially and culturally inferior. It seems more plausible 
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 “While traveling in Anatolia, I have encountered such pure, beautiful and prolific 
Turkish race… Biologically speaking, it is a human type befitting material and spiritual 
developments, possessing perfectly evolved bone structure, flesh, head and nature.” 
BTTK, p. 51. 
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that such a transformation in aesthetics influenced the Turks only by relation –by way 
of the image of beauty reflected back at them in the mirror of the West.  
The participants repeatedly claimed that the view which regarded Turks as ugly 
was totally ungrounded.224 Another issue repeatedly emphasized was that the Turks 
definitely did not belong to the yellow race and had white skins.  
   Uzun boylu, uzun beyaz simalı, düz ve ya kemerli ince burnunlu, çok 
kere mavi gözlü ve göz kapakları çekik olarak değil ufki açılan Türk 
beyaz ırkın en güzel örneklerinden biridir.”225  
 
Dr. Şevket Aziz summarizes the results of his research on the issue as follows: 
“vasatinin üstünde bir boy (167.59), brakisefal bir kafa, leptosop (ince uzun) bir burun, 
kulaklar vasati dediğimiz bir ebatta bulunuyor; mongol gözü yok…”226 Yet he does not 
stop there; he goes on to a demonstration of his findings and presents the Congress a 
Turkish family he picked up at random from a village near Ankara: 
   Ankaranın biraz şimalinde Bağlum köyünden Apdullahı, kadınını ve 
küçük yavrusunu takdim ediyorum. İşte ince uzun burunlu, brakisefal ve 
antropoloji kitaplarında bu karakterlerle tavsif edilen halis dağlı adamı, 
alp adamı, Türk adamı. (alkışlar) Apdullah koyu olmayan gözlere, 
buğdaydan daha açık renkli kumral bıyıklara ve beyaz bir tene sahiptir. 
Fakat işte yavruları, saçları altın renkli olan bu yavru Türk ırkına 
mensuptur. (alkışlar) İşte Alp adamı… 
   İstikbale sessiz fakat çok ümit veren adımlarla ilerleyen Türk ırkını ve 
Türk neslini idame ettiren Türk yavrusuna bakınız. Asırlık ihmallere 
rağmen hala bereketli olarak ve bereket taşıyarak fışkıran uyanıklığı, 
kaniliyetleri kat’iyen mahvolmayan… Anadolu Türk köylüsüne 
bakınız.227  
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 BTTK, p. 47. 
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 “The Turks, who are tall and of long and white complexion, who have straight or 
aquiline but narrow noses and often blue eyes, and whose eye lids are not slanted but 
open up horizontally, are among the most beautiful examples of the white race.” Reşit 
Balip Bey, “Türk Irk ve Medeniyet Tarihine Umumî Bir Bakış”, BTTK, p. 159. 
226
 “An above-average height (167.59 cm), a brachycephalous head, a leptosop (narrow 
and long) nose, ears of a size we term average; no Mongol eyes.” Şevket Aziz Bey, 
“Türklerin Antropolojisi”, BTTK, pp. 277. 
227
 “I present Apdullah, his wife and his little child from Bağlum, a village to a little 
north of Ankara. Here is the narrow and long nosed, brachycephalous man, the genuine 
mountain man described in the anthropology books with these characteristics, the 
Alpine man, the Turkish man. (Applause) Apdullah has eyes that are not dark, an 
auburn beard that is lighter than the color of wheat and a white skin. Yet here is their 
child; this child with golden hair is a member of the Turkish race. (Applause) Here is 
the Alpine man… 
Look at the Turkish child who perpetuates the Turkish race and the Turkish generation 
which advance to the future with silent but quite promising steps. Look at the Anatolian 
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The participants, who argued that the norms of beauty which were thought to be 
the characteristics of the Europeans –like white skin, colored eyes and fair hair- were 
actually the characteristics of the Turks, were trying to establish once again the thesis 
that every good thing had to be of Turkish origins. As opposed to common belief, the 
Turks were not Europeanized; rather the Europeans were Turkified. In Reşit Galip’s 
words:  
   Bizim tipimizin Avrupalılaştığı değil fakat asılları protonegroit ve 
protoostraloit olan Avrupalıların Türklerin daimi akınları ve çok sıkı 
temasları neticesinde Türkleşerek bugünkü tipi aldıkları ve onları bu 
neticeye ulaştırabilmenin Türkler için pek zahmetli bir iş teşkil etmiş 
olduğu söylenebilir. (Alkışlar)228 
 
To recapitulate, the racist views on the human body affected the intellectuals of 
the early Republican era in two ways: through the scientific literature on races and 
through a new understanding of human beauty fostered by the Europeans. In reaction, 
they imagined an ideal national body -combining all the physical traits affiliated with 
the Europeans and the qualities of control and virility; and they situated that body in the 
ideal un-spoilt Anatolian village. The beautiful homeland populated by the beautiful 
Turkish people; yet another myth of nationalism.       
                                                                                                                                               
villager whose vigilance and talents that burst out abundantly and carrying abundance, 
are ultimately un-spoilt in spite of centuries of negligence.” BTTK, pp. 278. 
228
 “It can be said that our physical appearance did not Europeanize; but that the 
Europeans who had originally been proto-Negroid and proto-ostraloit, have been 
Turkified to acquire their present appearance as a result of the constant raids of and the 
close contact with the Turks; and that it has been quite a burdensome work for the Turks 
to be able to make them attain such a result.” BTTK, p. 158. 
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4 
 
NATION IMAGINED AND THE FIRST TURKISH HISTORY CONGRESS 
 
 
 
   History of the Nations, beginning with our own, is always already 
presented to us in the form of a narrative which attributes to these entities 
the continuity of a subject. The formation of the nation thus appears as 
the fulfillment of a “project” stretching over centuries, in which there are 
different stages and moments of coming to self-awareness.229 
  
The primary aim motivating the project of producing an official history thesis 
and its accompanying history textbooks befitting the needs of the new Republic -which 
culminated in the convening of the First Turkish History Congress-, was providing the 
Turkish nation with such a historical narrative of its own. All nations require a glorified 
past, not only for self-esteem and international recognition but also for legitimating the 
revolutionary measures being undertaken in the name of the regeneration of the nation. 
Hence, the importance of an historical narrative tailored for the current purposes of the 
state. The new Republic was no exception to this case. There were traumatic 
transformations going on in the daily life of the people, which needed to be legitimated 
and naturalized; the new nation had to be homogenized through standardized education, 
leading to a higher level of unity; the loyalty of the nation to the homeland was to be 
strengthened for only then could people be expected to die for the defense of its borders; 
the self-esteem of the new nation needed to be repaired and the prejudices of the 
Western nations claiming cultural and racial superiority were to be countered; the new 
nation had to be supplied with a new identity which posed as ancient and authentic, as 
the true identity of the nation; the ensuing crisis of identity and security, resulting from 
the rapid dislocations that the new regime created, had to be overcome by locating the 
nation definitively in space and in time. 
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 We have previously underlined the importance of myth-making and of national 
history, which combine to produce a historicist national culture, in the formation of the 
national identity. The First Turkish History Congress, along with the new set of history 
textbooks which were its reason and result, contributed to the formation of a historicist 
discourse in Turkey. This discourse provided the context for the development of the 
Turkish national identity.  
 This new national identity was being formed along three axes: space, time and 
body. The nation had to be securely located in space and in time; the homeland had to 
be first defined and then glorified and the antiquity of the nation established. Meanwhile 
aesthetics of the ideal national body had to be formed. Providing myths in every one of 
these three axes, the participants of the Congress were actively attempting to construct 
the nation and its identity and culture. Aside from questions of the verifiability of the 
papers presented or the popular resonance and success of the project undertaken, this 
attempt alone makes the Congress crucial for the formation of the Turkish nation; and 
thus meaningful as an object of study. 
 The primary assumption of this thesis is that the nations are cultural constructs. 
Starting from this point, the next step was to figure out the nature of the act of 
construction that was involved in the making of the nations and nationalisms. Following 
Anderson, it is claimed that the overriding characteristic of act of the making of the 
nation is its imaginary quality; nations, nationalisms and nationalities are all imagined.  
To be able to understand nations, nationalisms and nationalities, one needs to 
examine the methods of their construction. In this thesis, priority was given to the 
theories of Anthony D. Smith and especially his views on myths. Myth-making is one 
of the primary methods for the imagining/construction/invention of a nation. National 
myths become all the more potent for their intermingling with the national history, 
which is the main topic of this thesis: the national history thesis -and the First Turkish 
History Congress in which it was stated for the first time in its fully developed form- are 
treated not so much as instances in the development of the discipline of history, but 
rather as instances in the development of a new nation in need of new myths.  
In the early Republican period, the new regime was trying to locate its 
designated nation in space and in time. The new state had new frontiers which needed to 
be naturalized and historicized in order to become suitable to be worshiped and which 
required protection against counter-claims to title. It was trying to establish an image of 
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Anatolia as a glorious and beautiful homeland; as the land of the Turks from almost 
time immemorial.  
The task of establishing the antiquity of the nation was a parallel and interrelated 
undertaking. In order for nationalism to be able act as the new ‘civic religion’, it was 
necessary to endow the nation with an ever-existing quality. Only a nation which has 
always been there, could gather enough attraction for the members of the new/modern 
nation who were in search of identity and meaning in life; and only then it would be 
possible to imagine that the nation would always be there, thus providing the security 
sought by men who had lost faith in the magic of life.  
In order to accomplish these effects, the new regime utilized history –when 
history was not enough by itself, it was backed up by anthropology, archaeology, 
linguistics and geography. The use of all these scientific disciplines provided the nation 
with an aura of truth. Yet geared to the formation of a national –and a nationalist 
history- they provided more material for myth-making than for scientific knowledge. 
This was an intended outcome: national history required the legitimacy conferred to it 
by the academic discourses; yet if it remained purely academic, it would have no policy 
value for the regime. The First Turkish History Congress clearly demonstrated all these 
points; in contrast to all the scientific jargon utilized, its main aim was to develop a 
simple thesis of history that could be disseminated through the education system and 
that could capture the imagination of the members of the new nation. The Congress and 
the history text-books it propagated contributed to the development of all kinds of new 
myths, from those of ethnic descent to those of golden age. Ultimately, all these efforts 
combined and went into the creation of a nationalist historicist culture and its 
accompanying Romantic discourse.              
The final element which was required by the national narrative was the ideal 
national body of the ideal national man; he was to be situated in the temporal and spatial 
location secured for the nation. This process was to a large extent affected by the race 
theorist and the aesthetic notions of human beauty. Proving the beauty of the national 
body was as crucial for the nationalist intelligentsia as was providing the nation a solid 
standing in temporal-spatial terms.  
To recapitulate, the national history thesis and the project of the development of 
nationalist history textbooks – and the convention of the First Turkish History Congress 
which was their result and their symbol- were all parts of a conscious effort on the 
behalf of the new regime -and the intelligentsia which aimed to gain power by relating 
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to that regime- to create or direct the creation of the national myths required by the new 
nation, contributing to the formation of a new national identity. Only the state power 
could undertake such an ambitious project of social engineering. The formation of a 
modern nation was first and foremost dependent upon the extensive use of the state 
apparatus, making possible the diffusion of the nationalist sentiments on a wide scale: 
for instance, one can hardly think of the creation of a homogeneous nation without 
standardized mass education. When thinking about the Turkish nationalism, one should 
keep in mind that the early Republic was the first time that mass literacy and 
standardized education system came into being in Turkey; this gave the new regime a 
tremendous amount of power over its population. 
To return to where we began, all these characteristics provide only a general 
framework for the Turkish nationalism and locate its position among other nationalisms 
with reference to certain typologies and general theories of nationalism. Anderson 
claims that what differentiates a nation from all the others is not its imagined quality, 
but the style in which it is imagined. If this is true, then we should concern ourselves not 
with the main axes of the nation-formation, but –so to speak- with the coordinates that 
the nation occupies along those axes: all national narratives try to locate the nation 
along temporal, spatial and bodily axes; what differentiates one nation from the other is 
the exact location it occupies in the conjuncture of these three axes.  
In the hope of acquiring a sense of the specific location occupied by the Turkish 
nationalism –of finding traces of its distinctive qualities-, this thesis undertook a close 
examination of the papers presented in the First Turkish History Congress. The 
peculiarities of the Turkish nationalist discourse coincided with the limits of the 
national imagination: there were so many things that the nation could not be, to the 
extent that it was defined by them. It developed in reaction to its Ottoman past, to Islam, 
to its position within the world-system, to its European counterparts and to its minority 
populations -to name but a few of them. The strategies adopted by the intelligentsia to 
circumvent all those things that the nation should and could not have been, more often 
than not, gave the Turkish nationalism its distinctive coloring.    
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